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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first one studies the effect of labor
policy, in particular of firing costs, on financially restricted firms. It proposes and
models an effect of firing costs that has not been described in the literature so far.
When a time gap exists between production and its associated revenues, firing can
become a liquidity adjustment tool that allows firms to increase their short-term
liquidity. The presence of firing costs reduces the ability of firms to use this tool.
This reduction negatively affects the optimal levels of investment and production of
financially restricted firms. I present empirical evidence in line with this effect.
The second essay studies the empirical relationship between aggregate macroeco-
nomic volatility and idiosyncratic firm-level volatility. This relationship is a testable
implication of a rich set of theoretical models available in the literature. I propose a
consistent estimator of the variance of firms' real sales growth rate (proxy for idio-
syncratic volatility) based on the cross-sectional properties of firms' distribution. I
use optimal structural break tests and long-run relationship tests to study the rela-
tionship between aggregate and idiosyncratic firm-level volatility. The main empirical
results suggest a negative and significant long-run relationship.
The third essay, coauthored with Norman Loayza, analyzes potential monetary
and fiscal policy biases that could result from the interaction between fiscal and
monetary authorities-in a macro-policy environment where the monetary authority
is committed to independently controlling inflation. We show that an increase in the
divergence of authorities' preferences, with respect to the short-run trade-off between
output and inflation gap, could lead to higher fiscal deficits and higher interest rates.
We use a game-theoretic model to analyze this interaction, and we present supporting
empirical evidence based on a panel data estimation for industrial countries.
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Chapter 1
Labor's Liquidity Service and
Firing Costs
The firing costs literature highlights two mechanisms by which firing costs affect firms'
behavior: i) the efficiency cost created by the incentive to keep workers with expected
marginal productivity below their wage (e.g.: Bentolila and Bertola 1990 and Lazear
1990); and ii) the effect that the cost of firing has on the bargaining process between
employees and employers (e.g.: Caballero and Hammour 1998 and Blanchard 2000).
This paper draws attention to an additional and independent mechanism that builds
from firms' demand for liquidity. The presence of financial restrictions, and the
resulting demand for liquidity, has been documented in the finance-related literature
(Lamont 1997, Rauh 2005, among others). However, financial restrictions have been
largely absent from the discussion of labor regulation.
The conventional views describe firing as an instrument either to adjust production
to its efficiency level, or as a bargaining tool. When there is a time gap between
production and its associated revenues, firing can also be understood as a liquidity
adjustment tool that allows firms to increase their short-term net working capital. In
other words, net liquidity is created by firing. From this perspective, a firm in need
of liquidity might find it convenient to fire a worker even if his expected marginal
productivity (in present value) is higher than his wage. This would allow the firm
to increase its net liquidity position, and as a result, relax its financial restriction. I
define this feature as labors liquidity service.
The value of labor's liquidity service is affected by the presence of firing costs.
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On the one hand, higher firing costs imply that more labor separations (potentially
costly separations) will be needed per unit of liquidity raised by firing. On the other
hand, higher firing costs could lock a firm into unavoidable situations, such as forced
liquidation or the inability to invest in more profitable endeavors with minimum-scale
requirements. Thus, the presence of firing costs reduces the value of labor's liquidity
service, which in turn affects firms' demand for liquidity and reduces firms' demand
for inputs (a downward scaling effect). I define this effect as liquidity service effect of
firing costs.
In the case of a firm with enough internal financial resources, or with access to
enough external sources of finance, an increase in firing costs will not have the above-
mentioned effect. No financial restrictions are present in such a case; the demand for
liquidity is zero, and therefore, the effect of the interaction between firing costs and
financial restrictions does not operate.
Employment protection legislation (EPL), in the form of dismissal procedures and
severance-penalty payments, is present in many countries around the world. Figure
1.1 shows the OECD's employment protection index EPL for OECD countries with
available data. The ELP index shows the well known presence of high employment
protection levels in some European countries vis-a-vis the USA. Overall, the data do
not present a significant declining trend during the last decade (the average value for
the late 1980's is 2.2 and for 2003 is 2.1).
The presence of employment protection, plus the existing evidence in the finance-
related literature that liquidity is important for firms, suggests that the liquidity
service effect of firing costs can have important macroeconomic aggregate effects. It
can not only affect the medium growth rate of an economy, but also the transitional
dynamics. The effects on the speed of employment recovery after a recession can
be of particular interest. Some facts suggest that these effects can be important: i)
small firms employment levels represent an important share of total employment and
total gross job creation (e.g.: in the USA, small firms with 10-249 employees repre-
sent approximately 30% of total employment, and small firms with 20-99 employees
represent approximately 22% of total gross job creation); and ii) small firms tend to
have less, and more pro-cyclical, credit access than large firms (Gilchrist and Gertler
1994). 1
'The estimates of small firms' importance are based on data from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics and from Davis et al. (1996).
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Figure 1.1. The ELP index corresponds to the OECD employment pro-
tection legislation of regular employment. Source: Employment Outlook,
OECD (2004).
This paper also draws implications for studying welfare effects of firing costs.
Hopenhayn and Rogers (1993), and the literature that followed 2, have characterized
the welfare effect of firing costs in neoclassical general equilibrium models. In these
papers, capital accumulation is only indirectly affected by firing costs-firing costs
affect employment levels, and employment levels affect the marginal productivity
of capital. When considering the liquidity service effect of firing costs, a new and
potentially important effect arises. Operating through the firms' cash flow constraint,
firing costs have a direct effect on the capital accumulation of financially restricted
firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a 3-period model that st udies
the liquidity service effect of firing costs. Section 3 provides empirical evidence in line
with the liquidity service effect of firing costs. I find a relatively stronger negative
effect of firing costs on value added of industries with higher liquidity requirements.
In addition, I find a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on value added
of small firms in more labor intensive sectors. Section 4 concludes and discusses
implications for labor policy design.
2Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Veracierto (2001), among others.
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1.1 A Model of Labor's Liquidity Service and
Firing Costs
1.1.1 The setting
Assume an entrepreneur that starts period 1 with initial wealth W and has access to a
profitable investment project. The project lasts for 3 periods (investment, production,
and output), uses labor and capital in fixed proportions (Leontief technology), and
has constant returns to scale.
In period 1, the entrepreneur sets up a firm to undertake the project and chooses
the project's scale H-the firm operates under conditions of limited liability, and the
scale of the project has a maximum size of H. Given the scale chosen, the firm hires
H workers (e.g.: trainee and start-up duties), and pays eH for this investment (e.g.:
plant and wages). The firm can fire workers in period 2 in order to keep only L < H
workers for production. The firm's labor-related cash outflow in period 2 is then
wL + (H - L), where p represents the level of firing costs faced by the firm ( > 0).
Note that the production technology assumes that production cannot be increased
instantaneously (e.g.: the necessary equipment needed per worker takes one period
to be installed). In period 3, the firm output is F(L) = AL.
The project is not free of uncertainty from the financial side. In period 2, the en-
trepreneur faces a stochastic liquidity shock Z that hits her level of wealth. This liq-
uidity shock is private information for the entrepreneur-a highly valued investment
or consumption opportunity (following Diamond and Rajan 2001). As a result, the
disposable wealth of the entrepreneur in period 2 is W- eH- Z, where Z U[, Z].
Following Hart and Moore (1994), I assume that the outcome in period 3 is not
verifiable (private information), and that firm's investment is specific to the entrepre-
neur. Due to the fact that the entrepreneur cannot contract upon the firm's future
outcome, the access to external sources of finance is limited.
As a result of these last two assumptions, the entrepreneur has to cover the liq-
uidity requirements of period 2 with her disposable wealth. If these liquidity needs
are not financed, the entrepreneur is forced to liquidate the firm. This financial re-
striction creates a demand for liquidity in period 1, with the purpose of building a
cash buffer stock to face the uncertainty in period 2 (insurance purposes).
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1.1.2 The problem of the entrepreneur
The problem of the entrepreneur can be written as follows. Given W, the entrepreneur
maximizes the value of the firm: 3
V(W) = max -eH + E (F(L) -wL-t(H-L))(1-I) (1.1)
H, (.), L(.)
Subject to:
H<H L<H
W-eH-Z>wL+(H-L)b if =0
W>eH
Where the control variable 11 takes the value of 1 if the entrepreneur liquidates the
firm in period 2 or the value of 0 if she does not liquidate.
Once the entrepreneur has decided the firm's scale in period 1, in period 2 she has
to decide the optimal labor force L. The marginal cost of an extra unit of L is either
the full cost of liquidation or w - ,b. With respect to the decision in period 1, note
that the marginal cost of an additional unit of H is always higher than or equal to
e + w (higher because of the possible costs associated with the presence of financial
restrictions). This is true only until the net benefit of staying in business is higher or
equal to the net benefit of liquidating the firm. Since the firm is under conditions of
limited liability, the entrepreneur may find it convenient to liquidate the firm if the
restructuring needed is big enough.
Thus, in period 2 the optimal strategy for the entrepreneur is to hit the corner
given by H or by the financial restriction, unless the necessary restructuring makes
the project unprofitable. With this in mind, the optimal decision in period 2 can be
written as:
H, if Z <F;
L(W H) W-Z-H(e+b) if ZF < Z < ZL; (1.2)
0 (liquidation), if ZL < Z.
3This formulation is equivalent to assuming a risk neutral entrepreneur that maximizes the sum
of her consumption from period 1 to period 3.
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Where ZF and ZL are given by:
ZF(W,H) = min{W-eH-wH, Z}
ZL(W, H) = min{W -eH - bSH, Z}, (1.3)
and 0 is defined as 0 AA-w+b'
The function ZF(W, H) represents the maximum size of the liquidity shock, such
that an entrepreneur with a firm of size H, and resources W -eH at the beginning
of period 2, can finance herself throughout the project. If Z > ZF(W, H) the entre-
preneur does not have access to enough liquidity, unless she creates internal liquidity
by firing part of the firm's labor force. Faced with this situation, the entrepreneur's
optimal decision is to finance the firm by reducing its scale to L and firing H - L
workers.
The entrepreneur could continue financing the project only if the liquidity shock
is not larger than W- eH- OH-when even firing all the work force does not
create enough liquidity to finance a higher cash outflow in period 2. However,
the entrepreneur will not necessarily finance the firm at that level of the liquidity
shock, because she might find it convenient to liquidate the firm before reaching that
point. The threshold level of the liquidity shock ZL(W, H), such that the entrepre-
neur decides to liquidate for any higher level, is given by the following condition:
AL - Lw - (H - L) > O. That is, staying in business is at least as profitable as
liquidating the firm. Given the optimal level of labor in period 2, we can solve for
zL(w,H). 4
The problem of the entrepreneur represented in equation 1.1 can be rewritten as:
ZL (W,H)
V(W) = max-eH + J F(L) - wL- (H- L)%b dG(z) (1.4)
Subject to the set of restrictions in equations 1.2 and 1.3 and to W > eH.
4 Note that w > 0, which implies that ZF(W, H) < ZL(W, H) (strong inequality unless it > w).
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1.1.3 Optimal scale
The first order condition (FOC) for the problem of the entrepreneur can be expressed
as:
ZF(W,H)
0 = -e + (A - w) dG(z)+
ZL(WH) [(A -) (e + )- ( -(e + P)1
1( 4 + ~~~~~d(z)JZF(W,H) l w-- J - dG
(1.5)
The first line in equation 1.5 represents the standard FOC of a firm in an economy
without capital market imperfections (pledgeable outcome). In this economy, enough
funds would always be available as long as the project has a positive net present value
(ZF = ZL = Z). The optimal scale H in this first best world would be given by H.
The second line in equation 1.5 represents the marginal effect of increasing the
scale H in period 1 on the expected cost of restructuring (in the states of nature where
a downward scaling is necessary to create liquidity). The first term in the integral
represents the cost associated with the net marginal income loss due to the marginal
increase in production destruction. The second term represents the marginal increase
in firing cost expenses due to the marginal increase in destruction.
For all states of nature where the liquidity shock in period 2 is above ZL(W, H),
the entrepreneur liquidates the firm and faces a continuation value of zero.
The first best allocation is not restricted to firms in economies with perfect
capital markets. In an economy with capital market imperfections, entrepreneurs
with a strong financial position also choose the optimal allocation H. In this model,
entrepreneurs with a strong financial position are defined as entrepreneurs with initial
wealth W, such that: 5
W > = (e + ) + -(A -w + )(we + w) ( 2 -Z)
- ~~~~(A-w+'~,)(e+w)
5 Depending on the parameter values, the minimum W, such that H* = H, could imply that
ZL(W) = Z or that ZL(W) < Z. If > (A-w-e)(2-Z) then ZL(W) = Z. That is, if the(A-w)(e~w),
maximum size of the project is sufficiently high, then the minimum W, such that H* = H, implies
that ZL(W) = Z. Without loss of generality, and in order to simplify the presentation, I am going
to assume that this condition holds.
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Solving for H in equation 1.5 determines the firm's optimal scale H* when W < W.
In deciding the optimal scale, the entrepreneur faces a trade-off between expanding the
initial investment to increase profitability in the good states of nature, and taking
a more conservative investment policy to reduce the cost of restructuring, or even
liquidation, in the bad states of nature. The risk of the marginal unit of H decreases
as initial wealth increases. As a result, the initial investment responds positively to
an increase in initial wealth.
This trade-off is confirmed with the closed solution for H*.
H*(W) = 
H, if W < W;
W 2  + (A-`+iP)(e+`) -Z _iinw -2± (A~-++)(e+ ) ( ,-Z) if WB < W <VP (1.6)e  (.6) 
W-2+ (A-w-e) (2 Z)
e w--(A (eif+W <wW) .
e~w+ (e+,) (A - + ( e + w,)e+-~ e+w+(A-o+,O) eV
Where WB - Zf+ (A-w-e)(Ae-we+-Oe+A1b) (-Z) is a threshold level of initial wealthWhere B = 2+(A-w+,O)(e+`)(A-`o) -
W such that below WB it is true that ZL(W) < 2, and above WB it is true that
ZL(W) = 2. Appendix 1.A.1 shows the details of this derivation.
As expected, the optimal scale H* increases with the level of initial wealth W
(strong inequality within the interior solution range):
aH* >
->0
aW -
The response of the optimal scale to an increase in initial wealth is higher at high levels
of W (W > WB). This is explained by the fact that there is no risk of liquidation
when W > WB.
This scale decision under the presence of financial restrictions parallels a portfolio
problem: the entrepreneur decides how much of her wealth W to allocate in the high-
return and high-risk asset (H), or in the low-return and low-risk asset (cash-liquidity).
There are two additional elements in this case: i) the scale H and the marginal risk
of an additional unit of H are positively related; and ii) the level of initial funds W
and the marginal risk of an additional unit of H are inversely related.
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1.1.4 The effect of firing costs
In this model firing costs have two effects. On the one hand, an increase in firing costs
makes the restructuring more costly. For each worker in excess that the firm hires in
period one (that has to be fired in the restructuring region), the firm has to fire e++
additional workers. The numerator (e + 4) represents the amount of liquidity used
by each worker in excess, and the denominator (w - 4) represents the amount of net
liquidity raised by firing an additional worker.
If X = 0, the entrepreneur is fully flexible to accommodate the liquidity resources
allocated to labor in period 1. In the bad states of nature, she can transform each
dollar assigned to wages in period 2 into a dollar of liquidity. As b increases, the value
of this liquidity service decreases. Creating liquidity by firing is additionally taxed
and more restructuring is needed to cover the same liquidity requirements in period
2. In the limit as - w, labor hired in period 1 becomes a fully fixed production
factor and ZL . ZF.
On the other hand, an increase in firing costs decreases the region of restructuring
(by increasing the region of liquidation), and increases the cost of liquidation. This
last effect only applies to entrepreneurs with sufficiently low level of initial wealth
(W < WB).
In summary, the presence of firing costs affects the firm by making the restruc-
turing process more costly and increasing the liquidation risk. As a result, it creates
the incentive to have a more conservative investment/employment policy (downward
scale effect). This argument is checked by differentiating equation 1.6. 6
AH* < O. if W < W;
OH* J<0~ ifW<W~ (1.7)
4 =0, ifW>W.
The optimal scale of an entrepreneur with a strong financial position (W > W)
is not affected by the presence of firing costs. Given her financial resources, either
the risk of restructuring is zero, or small enough that the higher expected return
compensates the risk at scale H.
6To see the effect in the case that W < WB, note that a necessary condition for the project to
be profitable is that A - w > e.
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The result of firing costs having no effect on unrestricted firms is not a general
result. To simplify and highlight the presentation of the liquidity service effect of
firing costs, the model presented in this paper shuts down the pure efficiency effect of
firing costs (by eliminating the stochastic component of labor productivity). Allowing
for this type of shock would not change the main conclusion: firing costs have a
differentiated effect on financially restricted and unrestricted firms, creating larger
distortions on financially restricted firms.
1.1.4.1 Less creation. Less destruction?
A key feature of dynamic models of firing costs is the fact that firing costs reduce
the willingness to hire workers, but they also reduce the incentives to fire workers.
This point is well summarized in Bentolila and Bertola's (1990) model, where they
show that an increase in firing costs could have either a positive or negative effect on
steady state employment level. In this sense, firing costs reduces creation, but also
reduces destruction. 7 8
In the model presented in this paper, we already studied the financially-related
negative effect that firing costs have on creation (H,). With respect to destruction,
there are two ways in which it could be affected by the presence of firing costs: i)
affecting the effective scale of production in period 2; and ii) affecting the optimal
scale in period 1 (assuming that the firm starts period 1 with a labor force greater
than zero). The latter effect is equivalent to the incentive to reduce firing in Bentolila
and Bertola's (1990) model.
Effective scale of production in period 2
From equation 1.7 we know that the optimal scale H* reduces as the level of firing
costs increases (for a given level of initial wealth). However, a reduction in H* implies
less risk of restructuring and/or liquidation in period 2. That is, the expected value
of labor in the second period, EL, could be lower because of lower H*, or could be
higher because of lower need of destruction. There is an additional effect to these
dynamics: for a given level of H*, an increase in firing costs increases the level of
7 What is unambiguous though, is the negative effect of firing costs on turnover.
8In their calibrations, they find that firing costs have a small, but positive effect on steady state
employment level.
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destruction in the second period. This last effect goes unambiguously in the direction
of lowering E L.
We can use the 3-period model presented in this paper to study these dynamics.
In this setting, the expected value of labor in the second period is defined as follows.
ZF ZL
EL* = H* dG(z) + F L(H*) dG(z) (1.8)
Note that the expected value of labor in period 2 can be written as a function of the
optimal scale in period 1 and the level of firing costs: E L* = A (H* (o), ) . Therefore,
E L* _ A(H*, ) H* 9A(H*, M) (1.9)
0--- aH* &4 +
The first term in equation 1.9 represents the first two effects mentioned before.
That is, the indirect effect that firing costs have over the expected production level
in period 2--through the effect that firing costs have over H*, and H* over EL*. In
the present model, the effect of reducing H* in period 1 dominates the corresponding
reduction in production destruction in period 2.
OA(H*,A) > (1.10)
OH*
Appendix 1.A.2 shows the details of this derivation. We already know that 8H* <0,
so the indirect effect of firing costs on E L* is also negative.
The third effect mentioned-that for a given level of H*, an increase in firing costs
increases the level of destruction in the second period-reinforces the result implied
by equation 1.10. As a result,
OE L* &A(H*,4,) H* &A(H*, )
&b~~~~~~~ -OH -  p< 0aEL' AA(Ht~ix) sh + H )<0 ° (1.11)04' 0H* 0'g 0'g
Thus, an increase in firing costs reduces the firm's initial investment/employment
decision, as well as the expected level of production in period 2. In other words, the
effective creation level, associated to E L*, responds negatively to an increase in firing
costs.
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Optimal scale and firing in period 1
How does the optimal scale H* change if the firm starts period 1 with a labor force
of size L- > H*? In the model presented in this paper, this scenario would create
an incentive to reduce destruction, as in the models with no financial restrictions like
Bentolila and Bertola's 1990. However, the incentive to reduce destruction is smaller
than the one created in the standard models of firing costs. Even more, for certain
parameter values, the fact that L- > H* can become an incentive to increase, instead
of reduce destruction.
When L- > H*, the problem of the entrepreneur can be written as follows. Given
W and L-, the entrepreneur maximizes the value of the firm:
V(W, L-) = Hm ax -eHl - [L- - H]+ + E (F(L) - wL - (H - L)p)(1 - )
H, (.), L(.)
(1.12)
Subject to:
H<H L<H
W-eH-+[L--H] + -Z>wL+(H-L)0 if =0
W > eH+ [[L - H]+
Where the control variable fi takes the value of 1 if the entrepreneur liquidates the
firm in period 2 or the value of 0 if she does not liquidate.
The FOC of this problem is similar to the FOC of the original problem (equation
1.5), but with an additional term (the first one). For the case when ZL < 2: 9
0 = ( (A )(L H)) {L->H}-e+ (A-w) dG(z)+
J- (1.13)
fz A -co)(e + ~b) p1 -(e + ?p)JZ (A -w)(e )- (i(e P) dG(z)
Appendix 1.A.3 shows the details of this derivation.
9When ZL = , the additional term is - IL(A-,)(e+,w)(L--H)) { ->H}. When ZF 
the additional term is pt {L- >H}.
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The term A1 {L->H} represents the standard incentive to reduce firing created
by the presence of firing costs. If the entrepreneur has a strong financial position
(W > W), then the presence of firing costs will have the standard effect. Note that
adding a positive term to the FOC implies that H* has to increase in order to balance
the FOC.
When financial restrictions are present, the term 1 {L->H} is counter-balanced
with the term - -(A-w)(L- -H) {L->H}, which represents the cost associated to the(z-z)
worsening of the firm's liquidity position. If this last term is sufficiently negative, the
incentive to reduce firing would become an incentive to increase firing.
In sum, the effect behind the standard argument that firing costs reduce destruc-
tion is also present in the model shown in this paper. However, the resulting effect
is the same only for financially unrestricted firms. For financially restricted firms,
the fact that L- > H* can either i) create an incentive to reduce destruction, but
with less intensity than for unrestricted firms, or ii) become an incentive to increase
destruction.
These results suggest that the differentiated effect of firing costs on financially
restricted firms-a relatively stronger downward scaling effect compared to financially
unrestricted firms-is present at the creation margin as well as at the destruction
margin.
1.2 Empirical Analysis
The main conclusion from the theoretical model is that firing costs have a stronger
negative effect on production levels when financial restrictions are present. I study
this conclusion empirically by analyzing the effect that the interaction between firing
costs and financial restrictions have on production, controlling for the corresponding
individual effect of firing costs and financial restrictions. In other words, the null
hypothesis tested is that the effect of firing costs does not depend on the presence of
financial restrictions.
The empirical approach is based on two sets of econometric analysis. The first one
centers on industry level data for a panel of countries (manufacturing sector). Bor-
rowing from the methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the presence
of financial restrictions is identified using cross-industry differences in the degree of
25
liquidity requirements implied by their technology of production. The legal level of
firing costs in each country, as defined by its labor law, is used as the source for layoff
costs variation. Using regression analysis, I test if the effect of firing costs on indus-
tries' value added (measured as their corresponding share of national manufacturing
value added) depends on their level of liquidity requirement.
One advantage of this analysis is that it allows the econometrician to control for
country characteristics. This is important because country characteristics, such as
financial and other labor institutional arrangements, could be correlated with the
outcome measure and the legal level of firing costs. Since firing costs represent a
country level characteristic, many cross-country studies that analyze the effect of
firing costs do not control for this feature. 10 Another advantage of this strategy
is that it relies on an exogenous source of financial restrictions variation. Centering
on firms' characteristics, such as firms' levels of debt or financial ratios, could create
endogeneity problems: these characteristics could determine a firm's level of access to
credit markets, but they are at the same time also determined by the firm's behavior.
The empirical analysis I follow is not free of limitations. First, labor laws are not
necessarily applied or supervised homogeneously across countries, which could lead
to measurement errors. Second, the identification strategy regarding financial restric-
tions requires the assumption that the technological differences across industries are
common across countries (aggregate differences in these measures across countries
do not pose a problem), and that they can be computed by analyzing the behavior
of firms operating in well developed financial markets (more on this later). Third,
studying industry data is an indirect way of analyzing firm behavior. A more direct
way would be to study firm-level data, although this approach also has its limita-
tions. The above mentioned difficulties in identifying exogenous sources of variation
in financial restrictions could be addressed using firms' size as a proxy-with the
understanding that small firms tend to have limited or no access to external sources
of finance. This could be done using manufacturing firm-level databases that are
available for some countries. However, most of these databases use plants as their
unit of account. Plants is not the relevant unit of account to address financial issues
related to the plants' production level because it does not necessarily characterize the
financial entity associated with that level of production. Therefore, using plants as
"
0This can also be the case for country-time panel data sets. As Layard (1990) states, "Un-
fortunately, changes in severance pay laws are quite rare, so the variation necessary to estimate
within-country effects with great precision is not likely to be present in these data." (His panel
consists of 22 countries and 29 years.)
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the unit of account undermines the quality of the variable size as a proxy for firms'
difficulty in accessing external sources of finance (as opposed to using firms as the
unit of account).
The second set of empirical evidence studies how the importance of small firms'
aggregate production-as a share of total sector production-varies with the level
of legal firing costs across countries. I use firms' size as a proxy for firms' difficulty
in accessing external sources of finance. This analysis is done in a difference in
difference setting by comparing the importance of small firms in a relatively labor
intensive sector (retail) with the importance of small firms in a relatively labor un-
intensive sector (wholesale). Contrasting two sectors allows us to control for country
characteristics, which, as mentioned before, is important for this type of estimations.
The identification strategy assumes that the liquidity effect of firing costs is less
important in the labor un-intensive sector: in the extreme case of a firm that uses
no labor, the liquidity effect of firing costs is zero. The advantage of using retail and
wholesale is that both are large sectors and belong to the same supply chain.
Many of the issues discussed for the first empirical analysis apply to this second
analysis as well. One further challenge in this case is how to define small firms. More
than one criterion can be used to identify small firms (e.g.: total sales, total assets,
number of employees) and surely no criterion is equally applied in the case of every
industry or firm. To address this issue, I use the number of employees as a criterion to
identify small firms; this variable is the most standard criterion used and it is an easy
variable to measure. I define a small firm as one employing fewer than 250 employees,
following a large number of sources that use firms' size in order to classify firms with
limited access to credit markets. Using the number of employees is also consistent
with the identification strategy since many labor laws define exemptions for firms
with fewer than 10-20 employees; this exemption level varies across countries.
In sum, this paper presents two econometric analyses for capturing the effect of
the interaction between firing costs and financial restrictions. Although some of their
features are new to the literature, these analyses are not free from some of the common
econometric difficulties present in labor and corporate finance literature.
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1.2.1 Empirical analysis: liquidity requirements
Let Yij be the importance of industry i's value added in country j's total manu-
facturing value added (measured as the corresponding ratio). The empirical model
estimated is given by the following reduced-form equation:
Yij = i + aj+ -lFC j LRi + 2Zij + ij (1.14)
Where FCj measures firing costs faced by firms in country j; LR/ measures the degree
of liquidity requirements implied by the particular technology of production of each
industry i; Zij is a set of control variables; aj and ai denote country and industry
aggregate effects, respectively.
The coefficient /31 is interpreted as the differential effect that firing costs have
on industries' behavior, according to their different degrees of liquidity requirements
(implied by their technology of production).
1.2.1.1 Measure of liquidity requirements
I follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology to identify technological character-
istics of industries. They compute a financially related ratio for each US listed firm,
and then construct the industry index as the median of all the observations within
each industry. They propose US listed firms as a benchmark by which to measure fi-
nancially related characteristics because the US financial market is the most efficient
credit market in the world, and because listed firms are usually those with better
access to financial markets. Therefore, the observed behavior of firms should be as
close as possible to the one implied by its technology of production, as opposed to a
firm's behavior conditionalized by its limited access to financial markets.
For this analysis, I use two different financially related ratios: Rajan and Zingales
(1998) measure of External Financial Dependence (EFD for short), and Gitman (74)
measure of Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC for short; see Raddatz (05) for a measure
of CCC at industry level). The former index captures the timing and amounts of
cash outflow and inflows related to investment and production, to assess liquidity
requirements related to the overall investing process. The latter index captures the
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length in days between the cash outflow from input expenses and the cash inflow from
sales, to assess liquidity requirements related to the production process.
These liquidity requirements indexes are constructed as follows: i) EFD is com-
puted as the median of the ratio capital expenditures-cash flow from operations among all US
capital expenditures a
listed firms within each industry (period 1980-89); ii) CCC is constructed in a similar
fashion to EFD, and is defined as days in inventories plus days in receivables minus
days in payables. Days in inventories is computed as total inventoriesd365 days in receivcost of goods sold
ota__________les__65_total payables.365 -89). Theables as total reesvables365 and days in payables as cost ofgodssold (period 1980-89). The
correlation between EFD and CCC is 0.08.
1.2.1.2 Sample, data, and estimation
The sample consists of 40 countries and 28 manufacturing industries. To control
for the quality of the data, all countries included have a per capita GDP higher
than $1000 in 1985 (1985 dollars). See Table A1 and A2 in Appendix 1.A.4 for the
composition of the sample.
The econometric approach is based on a panel data estimation with country and
industry fixed effects, and robust to a heteroscedastic error structure (at country-
industry level).
The dependent variable Yij is defined as industry i's share of total value added in
country j's manufacturing sector. It is computed as the median observation within
the period 1986-1995. Value added data is obtained from the Industrial Statistics
Database (UNIDO 2005, Rev2), which provides a country-year panel dataset with
disaggregated information for 28 industries across the manufacturing sector.
The source of firing costs variation is the legal levels of firing costs in each country
j as defined by its labor law. Legal levels of firing costs are obtained from Botero et
al. (03). The variable FCj measures the level of severance and penalty payments, in
weeks of pay, associated with firing a worker for economic reasons. The data presented
in Botero et al. (03) is collected for the year 1997.
The set of variables Zj contain controls that intend to capture financial effects
related to the industry variables EFD and CCC. This set includes the interaction
between the level of each country's financial development with each measure of liq-
uidity requirements (EFD and CCC); financial development is measured as domestic
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credit provided by the banking sector (fraction of GDP in 1985, World Development
Indicators). The correlation between firing costs and financial development is -0.10.
The presence of fixed effects at both industry and country level allows us to
control for general country characteristics, such as the degree of financial development,
aggregate productivity, labor laws, etc., and for general industry characteristics, such
as industry specific factors.
1.2.1.3 Results
Main Results
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 present the main empirical result of this paper.
The estimated coefficient /B, associated with the interaction between firing costs and
financial restrictions in equation 1.14, is negative and significant. This is true for
both variables associated with financial restrictions, EFD and CCC.
A negative value of p, indicates that an increase in firing costs has a relatively
stronger negative effect in industries with higher financial requirements. Note that if
financial markets worked perfectly, and as a result firms did not demand liquidity for
insurance purposes, the expected value of 1 would be zero.
This negative coefficient can be interpreted by analyzing what happens to the
threshold level W in the model presented in the theoretical section. W defines the
minimum level above which the firm's financial position is strong enough so that
the liquidity effect of firing costs does not distort its optimal allocation of resource
(H). As the liquidity requirements of production increase, the W threshold increases,
too. From an industry perspective, this implies that higher firing costs would have a
stronger negative effect on industries with higher levels of liquidity requirements.
The results of the core estimation also hold in a nested environment where both
interactive terms are included in the regression, as well as both financial controls
(Column 5 in Table 1). This estimation suggests that both measures, EFD and CCC,
could be capturing different aspects related to financial restriction.
Using this last estimation, I compute the economic effect associated with the
liquidity effect of firing costs. A one week reduction in firing costs is associated
with a 0.86% (EFD) and 1.14% (CCC) growth differential between an industry more
30
TABLE 1: The Effect of the Interaction between Firing Costs and Liquidity Requirements:
Main Results
Dependent Variable: Industry value added over total value added in manufacturing sector
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firing Costs It External Financial -0.113 -0.111 -0.099
Dependence (0.035)** (0.034)** (0.030)**
Firing Costs It Cash Conversion -0.131 -0.129 -0.121
Cycle (0.055)** (0.055)** (0.053)**
Financial Development It External 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.020
FmancmlDependence (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
Financial Development * Cash 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.030
Conversion Cycle (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)**
N 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066
R2 0.4808 0.4915 0.4945 0.4966 0.4996
Countries 40 40 40 40 40
Industries 28 28 28 28 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. Fixed effects control for
country and industry unobserved characteristics.
affected by the liquidity service effect and an industry less affected. The distance
between a more affected and a less affected industry is computed as one standard
deviation in the corresponding variable used to measure liquidity requirements.
The results for the control variables in Z in all estimations are consistent with
theory and with previous empirical evidence. The positive sign of these estimates
indicates that industries with higher financial needs benefit more from financial de-
velopment (Raj an and Zingales 1998).
In sum, the main empirical finding is the following. Controlling for country and
industry characteristics, as well as financial features particular to each industry in
each country, the effect of firing costs is more negative when the industry's degree of
liquidity requirements is higher. Also, the estimations are consistent with previous
findings related to financial effects at industry level.
Robustness Checks
This section presents alternative estimates for equation 1.14 that control for in-
dustries' labor intensity and countries' overall quality of institutions.
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The level of firing costs in a country could have a differentiated effect depending
on the industries' degree of labor intensity. Column 1 and 2 in Table 2 report the
estimates of /il controlling for the interaction between firing costs and industries'
level of labor intensity. The labor intensity ranking across industries is constructed
as the median value of the ratio between the number of employees in US industry i
to gross fixed capital formation in US industry i (period 1986 and 1995, Industrial
Statistics Database). Gross fixed capital formation is deflated by the US nonresident
gross private domestic investment deflator. The correlation between labor intensity
and EFD, and between labor intensity and CCC, is -0.22 and 0.37, respectively.
The negative coefficient of the interactive term between firing costs and liquidity
requirements confirms the main result presented in Table 1: a relatively stronger
negative effect of firing costs on industries with higher liquidity requirements. This
allows us to reject the possibility that the liquidity requirement variables (EFD and
CCC) could be working as proxies for the industries' labor intensity.
The coefficient related to the interaction between firing costs and labor intensity
is negative and significant when using the EFD measure. This could be attributed to
the negative efficiency effect of firing costs in resource allocation, in particular with
respect to the labor factor. However, this result is not found when using the CCC
measure. One possible explanation is the positive correlation between CCC and labor
intensity.
Legal levels of firing costs could be correlated with other institutional arrangement
that can affect firms with higher dependence on external sources of finance (in addition
to the degree of financial development). To control for this effect, I estimate equation
1.14 adding the interactive term between liquidity requirements and a general index of
countries' rule of law, where higher means more rule of law (Knack and Keefer 1995).
The rule of law variable measures the citizens' willingness to accept the established
institutions, to make and implement laws, and to adjudicate disputes during the year
1985. This variable also allows us to control for potential measurement error related
to the difference in enforcement and supervision of labor laws across countries. The
correlation between rule of law and firing costs, and between rule of law and financial
development, is -0.31 and 0.25, respectively.
The third and fourth columns in Table 2 show the estimation of equation 1.14,
controlling for the interaction between rule of law and liquidity requirements. The re-
sults are consistent with the results from Table 1 and Table 2, suggesting the presence
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TABLE 2: The Effect of the Interaction between Firing Costs and Liquidity Requirements:
Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Industry value added over total value added in manufacturing sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firing Costs * External Financial -0.124 -0.101 -0.076 -0.065
Dependence (0.036)** (0.030)** (0.035)** (0.032)**
Firing Costs * Cash Conversion -0.136 -0.118 -0.104 -0.097
Cycle (0.058)** (0.055)** (0.059)* (0.057)*
Firing Costs * Labor Intensity
-0.505 0.172 -0.071
(0.255)** (0.230) (0.218)
Rule of Law * External Financial 0.543 0.51
Dependence (0.182)** (0.177)**
Rule of Law * Cash Conversion 0.405 0.371
Cycle (0.258) (0.253)
Financial Development * 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.016
External Financial Dependence (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.006)**
Financial Development * Cash 0.0310 0.0300 0.0300 0.0310 0.0270 0.0270
Conversion Cycle (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)**
N 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066
R2 0.4955 0.4968 0.4996 0.4978 0.4989 0.5048
Countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
Industries 28 28 28 28 28 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. Fixed effects control for
country and industry unobserved characteristics.
of the liquidity service effect of firing costs. The coeffici~nt related to the interaction
between firing costs and rule of law is positive, but significant only when using the
EFD measure. A positive coefficient reflects the expected positive effect of rule of law
in fostering financial intermediation (i. e.: contracts are more easily enforced).
Asset collateralization
The previous empirical exercises concentrate on measures of liquidity require-
ments. An alternative way of measuring financial restrictions is to look at the firm's
ability to collateralize its assets: higher collateralization means better access to' ex-
ternal financial resources.
To test this idea I use Braun's (2003) index of collateralization or degree of tangi-
bility of industries' assets. In a similar fashion to Rajan and Zingales (1998), he uses
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TABLE 3: The Effect of the Interaction between Firing Costs and Liquidity
Requirements: Asset Collateralization
Dependent Variable: Industry value added over total value added in manufacturing sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firing Costs" Tangibility 0.337
0.339 0.366 0.306 0.302
(0.143)** (0.139)** (0.159)** (0.152)** (0.153)**
Firing Costs * External Financial -0.114 -0.11 -0.114 -0.079
Dependence (0.034)** (0.033)** (0.034)** (0.035)**
Firing Costs * Labor Intensity
0.181
(0.265)
Rule of Law * Tangibility
-0.553 -0.593
(0.643) (0.643)
Rule of Law" External Financial 0.549
Dependence (0.188)**
Financial Development * Tangibility -0.058 -0.058 -0.058 -0.054 -0.053
(0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)**
Financial Development ..External 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.019
Fmanc~/Dependence (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)*.
N 1066 1066 1066 1066 1066
R2 0.4838 0.495 0.4951 0.4957 0.4991
Countries 40 40 40 40 40
Industries 28 28 28 28 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses: .. significant at 10%, .... significant at 5%. Fixed effects control
for both, country and industry unobserved characteristics.
US listed firms to estimate the industries' availability of tangible assets as a measure
of collateral. The ratio computed is net property, plant, and equipment. I will refer to this
total assets
index as TAN. The correlation of TAN with EFD, CCC, and labor intensity is 0.01,
-0.77, and -0.51, respectively. Given the high correlation of TAN with ecc, I exclude
the latter from this set of estimations.
Table 3 shows the main empirical results of this paper replicated using the TAN in-
dex. Since higher TAN means better access to financial markets, a positive coefficient
would be consistent with the liquidity service effect. The results in the first column
of Table 3 show a positive estimate for the coefficient of interest, which indicate
that an increase in firing costs has a relatively stronger negative effect on industries
with lower levels of asset collateralization. The next columns replicate the robustness
checks done for the estimations using the measures of liquidity requirement, and show
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that the main conclusion holds.
1.2.2 Empirical analysis: market participation of small
firms
This section presents a difference in difference exercise that studies the effect of firing
costs on the market participation of small firms (measured as their share of total
sector value added). I use firms' size as a proxy for firms' difficulty in accessing
external sources of finance, and I control for country characteristics by comparing the
presence of small firms in a relatively labor intensive sector (retail) with the presence
of small firms in a relatively labor un-intensive sector (wholesale).
The advantage of using retail and wholesale sectors is that they use labor and
capital in significantly different proportions, that both are important sectors in the
economy, and that both sectors belong to the same supply chain (both sectors exclude
sale as well as maintenance and repair of motor vehicles). Using US national accounts
and labor statistics, I compute the ratio of labor to capital in the retail and wholesale
sectors. Labor is measured as employment and capital as stock of structure, equip-
ment, and software. The average labor to capital ratio for retail during the period
1990-1999 is 4.4 times higher than the average ratio for wholesale. Yearly figures are
appropriately deflated using the price indexes for structure and for equipment and
software. 
The empirical analysis is based on the following formulation. Let Sij be the share
of small firms' value added in sector i of country j. The empirical model estimated
is given by the following equation:
Sij = ai+a + aj FCj D + ij (1.15)
Where FCj measures firing costs faced by firms in country j; Di is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one in the labor intensive sector and zero otherwise; caj and ai
denote country and sector aggregate effects, respectively.
"Aggregating all 12 countries included in the sample (see next section), value added in the whole-
sale sector in 1999 represented 5.6% of total GDP, and value added in the retail sector represented
4.6%.
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The coefficient 01 is interpreted as the differential effect that firing costs have on
the share of small firms' value added in the more labor intensive sector vis-a-vis the
effect on the share of small firms' value added in the less labor intensive sector.
Following the discussion in the previous section, it is important to take into con-
sideration the levels of liquidity requirements in both sectors. If the liquidity require-
ments are higher in the wholesale sector, then the expected sign of 01 is ambiguous.
On the one hand, higher firing costs could imply a heavier burden for small firms
in wholesale because of higher liquidity requirements, but at the same time, a lower
burden for these type of firms because of lower labor intensity. To address this issue,
I study the level of EFD and CCC in both sectors using Rajan and Zingales (1998)
methodology. The estimates show that wholesale has a lower EFD and a higher CCC.
For both measure of liquidity requirement, the difference between the estimate for
the whole sector minus the estimate for the retail sector is, however, small: -0.18
for EFD and 0.06 for CCC; these differences are expressed as shares of the max-min
range observed among manufacturing industries for EFD and CCC, respectively.
1.2.2.1 Data and Results
The sample consists of 12 EU-15 countries with available sectoral data on aggregate
value added for firms of different sizes, where size is defined by the number of em-
ployees working in the firm (see Table A3 in Appendix 1.A.4 for the composition of
the sample). The data is obtained from Eurostat's Structural Business Statistics and
covers the period 1996-2001.
Many labor laws define exemptions for firms with fewer than 10-20 employees;
this exemption level varies across countries. For this reason, I define small firms as
firms employing between 10 and 249 employees. Robustness checks are performed
using the alternative range of 20 to 249 employees.
Figure 1.2 provides a first look at the data. It shows the difference in difference
calculation, but instead of grouping countries into high and low firing costs groups,
it plots the difference between the presence of small firms in retail and in wholesale
(SRj - Swj) against the level of firing costs in each country. The data is for the year
1999, the only year with data for all 12 countries. This figure suggests that the impact
of firing costs is relatively stronger in more financially restricted firms operating in
a more labor intensive sector (small firms in the retail sector). Note that if financial
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Figure 1.2. Correlation between firing costs and the difference between
the small firms' share of value added in the retail and wholesale sectors.
restrictions play no role in determining the effect of firing costs, no correlation would
be expected.
The negative correlation observed in Figure 1.2 is confirmed with the estimates
of the parameter e in equation 1.15. The first column in Table 4 shows the estimate
of e using only data for 1999, while the second column shows the result for the same
estimation using all available data with standard errors clustered at the country level.
The main conc!usion from these estimates is the following: Firing costs are associated
with a relatively stronger negative effect on small firms' market participation in the
more labor intensive sector.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 report the results for estimations equivalent to the
ones presented in the first two columns of Table 4, but redefining small firms as firms
employing 20 to 249 employees. The results are similar to the ones found with the
alternative definition of 10 to 249 employees.
A second robustness check is performed by studying the share of value added
associated with firms employing between 1 and 9 employees. Since labor laws exempt
these firms from layoff costs, we should not find the negative effect of firing costs that
we find in the previous estimations. These estimates are reported in the fifth and
sixth columns of Table 4, showing a positive instead of negative effect of firing costs.
This result is consistent with a negative effect of firing costs on financially restricted
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TABLE 4: The Effect of Firing Costs on Small Firms' Market Participation:
Main Results
Dependent Variable: Small firms' value added in sector i over total value added
in sector i (=Retail, Wholesale)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Definition of a small firm (# of employees)
10-249 10-249 20-249 20-249 1-9 1-9
Firing Costs * Sector -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 0.008 0.009
Dummy (Retail=1) (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)**
N 24 98 24 98 24 98
R2 0.9714 0.9479 0.9768 0.9582 0.9333 0.9308
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12
Years 1 6 1 6 1 6
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. Fixed effects
control for sector, country, and year unobserved characteristics. The standard errors are clustered
at the country level for the estimates with more than one year of data.
firms, and suggests a size and/or sector selection among small firms, most likely to
avoid the cost of being subject to the full extent of the labor law.
1.3 Conclusions
This work draws attention to an additional mechanism by which labor policy, in
particular firing costs, affects the behavior of financially restricted firms. In short,
the presence of firing costs reduces the ability to generate net liquidity through firing,
and decreases the value of labor's liquidity service. As a result, there is a differentiated
effect of firing costs on financially restricted firms, which is present at the creation
margin as well as at the destruction margin.
Empirical evidence in line with this channel is presented. Controlling for country
and industry characteristics, as well as for related financial features particular to
each industry in each country, I find that the effect of firing costs on industries' value
added is relatively more negative in industries with higher liquidity requirements. In
addition, I find a negative effect of firing costs on the participation of small firms in
more labor intensive sectors.
The main implication suggested by this paper is the following: A reduction in
dismissal costs could have a proportionally higher benefit on firms for which financial
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restrictions are a relevant constraint. This proposition has two direct implications for
labor policy design.
First, countries with less developed financial sectors, where firms face more limited
access to credit, could, ceteris paribus, benefit more from a reduction of firing costs.
This effect would be in addition to the efficiency gains associated with the standard
efficiency costs of firing costs (Bentolila and Bertola 1990 and Lazear 1990).
Second, the differentiated effect of firing costs on financially restricted and un-
restricted firms suggest that, ceteris paribus, a heterogeneous labor policy within a
country could be beneficial. Compared to a homogeneous labor policy that estab-
lishes identical dismissal costs for all types of firms, a heterogeneous labor policy
that establishes lower firing costs for small firms could, without changing the average
level of job turnover in the economy, increase the incentive to allocate capital and
labor based on productivity considerations rather than financial concerns-with the
understanding that small firms are generally considered to be firms with limited or
no access to credit markets (compared to large firms).
Given the importance of small firms in the gross creation of employment, this pol-
icy design could also be considered as a mechanism to promote employment creation.
Many governments actively use public works, wage subsidies, and credit to small firms
as a means to increase job creation, especially when unemployment is high.
In fact, labor laws in many countries do exempt smaller firms from employment
protection measures. In this regard, the model presented in this paper can be un-
derstood to be a rationalization of this policy. The actual cut-off that legally defines
an exempt firm changes from country to country, although in most cases it is around
10 to 20 employees. A large number of sources that use firms' size in order to clas-
sify firms with limited credit access, however, tend to define the cut-off around 250
employees. Therefore, the policy implication of this paper suggests that if financial
reasons are to be taken into consideration, the legal cut-off levels used to exempt
firms from paying dismissal costs might need to be reconsidered.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Deriving the threshold WB
1.A.1.1 The case when ZL < 2
Assume a solution H*, such that ZL < Z. From the first order condition in equation
1.5, we know that such a solution has to be of the following form.
W - 2 + (A-w) (2 z)
H* = (A-w) (1.16)
e +  (e++) (A - w + (e  w) - - (16  w + (A-w+~)(A))
To be consistent with the above statement, the following inequality has to hold.
W -H*(e +0) < 2 (1.17)
Where H* is given by equation 1.16, and 0 =- A+A-w+or
Working out the inequality in equation 1.17, we can derive a condition for W, such
that the solution given by equation 1.16 is consistent with the statement in equation
1.17. This condition is represented in equation 1.18.
(A - w - e)(Ae - we + We + A) Z) = WB (118
_+ (A - w + )(e + w)(A - w) (1.18)
Note that a strong inequality in condition 1.17 implies that W < WB.
1.A.1.2 The case when ZL= 2
Assume a solution H*, such that ZL = Z. From the first order condition in equation
1.5, we know that such a solution has to be of the following form.
W - 2 + (A-w-e)(w-i) (Z Z)
H* +(A-w+b)(e+w) = (1.19)
e + w
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To be consistent with the above statement, the following inequality has to hold.
W- H*(e+ ~bO) > Z (1.20)
Where H* is given by equation 1.19, and 0 _ A+
Working out the inequality in equation 1.20, we can derive a condition for W, such
that the solution given by equation 1.19 is consistent with the statement in equation
1.20. This condition is represented in equation 1.21.
- (A-w-e)(Ae-we+e+A)(2 Z) WB
W > Z + (A-w+  )(e+w)(A -w) (1.21)
In sum, we know from equation 1.18 that above the threshold WB there is no
solution to H*, such that ZL < Z. Likewise, we know from equation 1.21 that below
the threshold WB there is no solution to H*, such that ZL = Z. Therefore, it has
to be true that there is only one solution for each level of W, and that such solution
implies ZL < Z, for all values of W < WB, and ZL = Z for all values of W > WB.
1.A.2 The effect of optimal scale on the expected
labor in period 2 (-.*)
value of
From equation 1.8, we can write the expected value of labor in period 2 as:
H* - (-ZF)2
2(w-,)(Z-Z)
EL* = + H * ( A-wH(-) -w+(e+w)) +
- -+H* (w- ) ( A-w ) 
H* ( -0~0)(1 --A-u)
if W> WB
ifW WB
(1.22)
Differentiating equation 1.22:
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1 - (e+W)(2-ZF) (-)(z-z) > 
= EL + H* (e+O) (A1ff *_ (A-w+VJ)(Z-Z) if W> W
B
-w+ (e+w)+) +
H* (w- 0PO) (1 2(A-w+T)) > ifW < WB
(1.23)
For the case when W > WB, we know that H*(e+w) = W-Z+ (A- )() (Z-
Z), which implies that H*(e + w) -W + < ) ) (note that--) <
This last inequality implies that (Z - ZF)(e + w) < (w - )(Z - Z), and therefore,
that 1 - (e+w)(2-ZF) > 0(w-0)(Z-Z)
For the case when W < WB, it is straight forward to see that the derivative is
positive. Just note that A > w, that w > 4p0, and that A-w < 1.2(A-w+iP)
In sum, an increase in the initial scale of the project (optimal) increases the
production level in period 2.
1.A.3 First order condition when L- > 0
Following the same steps used to derived the FOC in equation 1.5, we can write the
FOC for the case when ZL < Z.
0 =' 01 {L->H} - e + (A
W-H(e+,0)-i[L--HJ (A
JW-H(e+w)-P[L--H]+ L
- w) JW-H(e+-)-k[L--H]+
) Z
-~ - _____
The integral fW-H(e+)-0[L--H]+ dG(z) can be written as fw-H(e+w)dG(z)-
foL -H]+ dG(z). Rearranging terms:
4p(A-w)(L - H)
(z - Z)
ZL(WH)[ -
JZF(W,H) [
) {L->H} -e+ (A
-w) - (e + D) _ (
W - p
1- -(e + )
w-0w)]
-w) F(WH) dG(z)+
(1.25)
dG(z)
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&EL*
OH*
dG(z)+
(1.24)
dG(z)
0= (-
-.) -(e + 0)
W - 0
The FOC condition in equation 1.25 is identical to the FOC in equation 1.5 (orig-
inal problem), except for the additional first term.
When Z(W) = Z an equivalent derivation yields the same type of analysis (see
footnote 9).
1.A.4 Composition of the samples
Table Al: Manufacturing Sample (Countries)
Country Number of Observations Country Number of Observations
Argentina 28 Malaysia 28
Australia 28 Mexico 26
Austria 28 Netherlands 27
Belgium 19 New Zealand 26
Brazil 18 Norway 28
Canada 28 Panama 25
Chile 28 Poland 28
Colombia 28 Portugal 28
Denmark 28 Romania 27
Ecuador 28 Singapore 26
Finland 28 South Africa 28
France 26 Spain 28
Greece 28 Sweden 28
Hungary 28 Switzerland 13
Ireland 27 Tunisia 22
Israel 28 Turkey 28
Italy 28 United Kingdom 28
Japan 28 United States 28
Jordan 28 Uruguay 28
Korea 28 Venezuela 28
Total 1066
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Table A2: Manufacturing Sample (Industries)
ISIC Code Industry Name Number of Observations
311 Food products 40
313 Beverages 39
314 Tobacco 39
321 Textiles 40
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 40
323 Leather products 37
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 36
331 Wood products, except furniture 40
332 Furniture, except metal 38
341 Paper and products 40
342 Printing and publishing 39
351 Industrial chemicals 40
352 Other chemicals 38
353 Petroleum refineries 36
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 32
355 Rubber products 40
356 Plastic products 38
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 39
362 Glass and products 35
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 36
371 Iron and steel 40
372 Non-ferrous metals 36
381 Fabricated metal products 37
382 Machinery, except electrical 39
383 Machinery, electric 39
384 Transport equipment 38
385 Professional & scientific equipment 37
390 Other manufactured products 38
Total 1066
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Table A3: EU Sample
Country Number of Observations
Austria 10
Belgium 12
Denmark 6
Finland 8
France 10
Ireland 2
Italy 12
Netherlands 6
Portugal 10
Spain 6
Sweden 8
United Kingdom 8
Total 98
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Chapter 2
Idiosyncratic Volatility of US
Listed Firms and the Great
Moderation
During the last decade, the literature has provided a rich set of theoretical models
that link microeconomic volatility with aggregate volatility (Obstfeld 1994, Acemoglu
1997, Philippon 2003, Comin and Philippon 2005, and Comin and Mulani 2005). All
these theories, although not for the same reasons, imply a negative correlation between
aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility.
Empirically, it has been extensively documented that aggregate volatility of the US
real economy has declined during recent decades (Kim and Nelson 1999, McConnell
and Perez-Quiros 2000, Blanchard and Simon 2001, Stock and Watson 2003). How-
ever, there seems to be less consensus on the evolution of idiosyncratic volatility. On
the one hand, Campbell et al. (2001), Comin and Mulani (2004), and Comin and
Philippon (2005) have identified a steady increase in firm-level volatility during the
last five decades, both using real data (i.e.: output) and financial data (i.e. the value
of the firm). On the other hand, Davis et al. (2006) shows that firm volatility for the
overall mass of firms in the US economy has decreased during the last three decades. 
The present paper revisits the empirical evidence on the evolution of idiosyncratic
firm volatility, contributing in three ways. It provides a consistent estimator of firms'
real sales growth rate variance (our measure of idiosyncratic volatility) based on the
cross-sectional properties of firms' real sales growth rate distribution. Second, the
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estimator proposed in this paper distinguishes between individual firm effects and
within firm effects, associating the latter with firms' idiosyncratic volatility. Third,
it formally tests for the existence of a long-run relationship between aggregate and
idiosyncratic volatility as well as for the possibility of a contemporaneous structural
break in both series. The existing empirical literature has not formally tested nor
quantified the long-run relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility.
The empirical approach proposed in this paper has two main advantages. It
does not estimate the firms' idiosyncratic volatility using the time series dimension
(as most of the existing empirical literature does), which implies that the resulting
time series for each firms' idiosyncratic volatility is not highly autocorrelated by
construction. Although the issue that concerns us in this paper is theoretically a
long-term effect, the sharp and permanent decrease of aggregate volatility observed in
the mid 80's-denoted in the literature as the "Great Moderation"-makes it useful
to have a clearer picture of the period-by-period dynamics of firms' idiosyncratic
volatility. It is reasonable to expect that if aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility are
related, this discrete jump has to be accounted for by the microeconomic evidence.
Figure 2.1 stresses this point. Panel A (left) shows the 12-months quarterly growth
rate of private GDP-aggregate real GDP minus government real consumption and
government real gross investment-and panel B shows the standard deviation of the
12-months quarterly growth rate of private GDP within the i10 quarters period. The
vertical line in panel A is placed in the first quarter of 1984, where we can visually
observe a drastic change in the volatility of private GDP growth. The two dotted
vertical lines in panel B show the range of time over which we observe a decline in
aggregate volatility when looking at the standard deviation constructed using the
time series dimension. In panel B, the observed decline in aggregate volatility "took"
20 quarters, while in the panel A it "took" 1 quarter. 2
2 Statistical techniques are used in McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) to identify the 1984.1
break; the authors state "In this paper, we document a structural break in the volatility of U.S.
GDP growth rate in the first quarter of 1984. As a mean of understanding this dramatic reduction
in volatility..."
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Figure 2.1.
Another advantage of the empirical approach proposed in this paper is that it
estimates firms' idiosyncratic volatility free of individual firm effects. This is not only
important for the cross section perspective-so as not to confuse idiosyncratic volatil-
ity with diverging trends across firms-, but also from a time series perspective-so
as not to confuse idiosyncratic volatility with a firm's trend. The methodology that
I use to compute individual firms effects allows for a slow moving process, which is
robust to a large class of individual effect dynamics (e.g.: convex and concave trends
as well as V-shaped and hump-shaped trends).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature regarding the relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility.
Section 3 describes the assumptions and methodology used to construct a consistent
estimator of firms' real sales growth rate volatility. Section 4 presents the data and the
estimate of firms' idiosyncratic volatility. Section 5 studies the long-run relationship
between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility. Section 6 presents conclusions.
2.1 Literature Review
The theoretical literature has provided a rich set of models that link firm-level micro-
economic volatility with macro aggregate volatility. Two causal directions have been
described in the literature. On the one hand, lower aggregate volatility can lead to
higher individual risk taking, and thus, to a higher idiosyncratic firm volatility (e.g.:
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macro stabilization policies). On the other hand, idiosyncratic firms' behavior can
lead to lower aggregate volatility.
The channels described through which this last effect could operate are the fol-
lowing. First, higher individual risk taking can lead to higher diversification and as
a result to lower aggregate volatility, where higher individual risk can result from an
increase in financial development and/or wealth (Obstfeld 1994 and Acemoglu 1997)
and/or lower macro volatility (virtuous cycle). Second, higher competition and less
deregulation in the goods market can reduce aggregate volatility. Philippon (2003)
stresses that more competition forces firms to adjust prices and margins faster, re-
ducing the impact of aggregate demand shocks. According to Comin and Mulani
(2005) and Comin and Philippon (2005) more competition reduces the persistence of
individual firms' market shares, and as a result, increases firms' R&D investments.
Higher R&D increases firm-level volatility, decreases co-movements between sectors,
and reduces aggregate volatility.
These theories imply a negative long-run relationship between idiosyncratic firm
volatility and aggregate volatility. Regarding the latter, it has been extensively doc-
umented that aggregate volatility of the US real economy has declined during the
recent decades (Kim and Nelson 1999, McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000, Blanchard
and Simon 2001, Stock and Watson 2003); see Figure 2.1. However, there has been
less consensus on the evolution of idiosyncratic volatility.
Campbell et al. (2001), Comin and Mulani (2004), and Comin and Philippon
(2005) have identified a steady increase in listed firms' volatility during the last
decades using both real data (i.e.: output) and financial data (i.e. the value of
the firm). Comin and Mulani (2004) and Comin and Philippon (2005) find that the
average volatility of real sales growth rate has almost doubled since the 1960's among
individual US listed firms; Campbell et al. (2001) find that average volatility of US
individual stock returns has more than doubled since the 1960's. Using a dataset
with listed and non-listed firms, Davis et al. (2006) show that firm volatility has
decreased during the last decades. In particular, they find that the average volatility
of the employment growth rate for the overall mass of firms in the US economy has
declined between 25% and 45%.
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2.1.1 Sample: listed vs. non-listed firms
When considering the difference between listed and non-listed firms, it is important to
note the dynamics that link growth, diversification, and higher individual risk taking
in Obstfeld 1994 and Acemoglu 1997. As previously mentioned, these relationships are
based on the idea that each agent can diversify its portfolio of risky assets/projects.
The subsanmple of listed and non-listed firms are different with respect to the extent
that these assets/projects are available to agents for diversification. Therefore, the
idiosyncratic volatility found in listed and non-listed firms does not necessarily have
equivalent implications. In particular, the sample of listed firms is more relevant for
the class of theories that relate growth, diversification, and higher individual risk
taking.
The following example emphasizes this point. Assume that agents in two economies,
A and B, invest the same aggregate amount in the same number of assets/projects.
However, in economy A this is done in a diversified way-each agent holds a share of
each asset/project-and in economy B this is done in an individual way-each agent
holds 100% of only one asset. The benefit of idiosyncratic diversification, and its
positive effect on growth and in agents' willingness to take risk, operates in economy
A but not in B. Agents in economy B are not diversifying their risk and therefore,
are making more precautionary (less risky) investment decisions. 
The difference between economy A and economy B can be considered parallel to
the difference between assets/projects listed in the stock market and assets/projects
not listed. The ownership of the latter group is more concentrated in only a few
agents' portfolios and are not available, to the same extent as listed assets/projects
are, as part of the diversifiable pool of assets/projects of most agents in the economy.
Therefore, two important considerations have to be taken into account when ana-
lyzing the empirical implications of theories like Obstfeld 1994 and Acemoglu 1997-
in particular when comparing aggregate volatility with idiosyncratic volatility. First,
the increase in idiosyncratic volatility does not necessarily mean that each firm's
volatility has to increase, but that the available pool of diversifiable assets/projects
contains more risky assets/projects. The latter implication can be better tested with
the sample of listed firms.
3Assume that agents in economy B have more wealth than agents in economy A. This helps to
reconcile the fact that agents in both economies are investing identically, but agents in economy B
are making more precautionary investment decisions.
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Second, shouldn't the riskiness of non-listed firms increase if the riskiness of listed
firms increases? On the one hand, it could be argued that if agents are more diversified
in their pool of listed assets/projects, then they would be willing to take more risk in
their non-listed, and individually owned, assets/projects. On the other hand, there
could be a "self-selection" of assets/projects according to their implicit risk. As more
agents in the economy start demanding more risky assets, they are willing to pay a
relatively higher premium to access this type of assets and a relatively lower premium
to access the less risky assets. This could imply that as the economy develops and
grows, more risky assets are relatively more demanded for diversification purposes
than less risky assets, pushing more risky assets into the diversifiable pool (stock
market) and less risky assets into the non-diversifiable pool (non-listed). If the latter
effect were stronger, then the evidence of the non-listed firms would give a misleading
picture.
2.2 A Cross-sectional View
Campbell et.al. (2001), Comin and Mulani (2004), and Comin and Philippon (2005)
center their empirical analyses of firms' idiosyncratic volatility on the time series
variation of individual firms. They compute their preferred measure of volatility per
firm (across time) and then extract a center tendency per period, either by computing
the mean or the median observation among firms within each period.
In this paper, I propose an alternative empirical strategy based on two observa-
tions. First, an increase in firms' volatility should not only lead to an increase in
the time series variance of each firm, but it should also lead to an increase in the
cross-sectional variance among firms in a given period (unless all observations in the
cross-section are perfectly correlated).
Second, if we assume that within each cross-section, firms' idiosyncratic real sales
growth is independently distributed across firms, then the sample variance estimator
for the cross-section sample is a consistent estimator of firms' real sales growth rate
variance (our measure of idiosyncratic volatility)-see section 2.2.2.2 for the details.
The sample of firms used in this paper does not necessarily satisfy the indepen-
dence assumption. To deal with this issue, I construct a measure of real sales growth
rate that is independent and idiosyncratic to each firm-adjusting for aggregate and
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sectoral effects, in order to eliminate dependence between the cross-sectional obser-
vations.
In what follows, I describe the assumption and methodology used to construct a
consistent estimator of firms' real sales growth rate variance.
2.2.1 Idiosyncratic volatility
2.2.1.1 Firm level
Let's define the stochastic process gi,8(t) as the family of random variables gi,8 ,t that
represent the real sales growth rate of firm i in sector s in period t. The index i has
a unique value for each firm and the index s only describes the corresponding sector
(is redundant for indexing each individual firm).
We can decompose each random variable into 4 components:
gi,s,t = t + gs,t + IE + IDt (2.1)
Where gt is an aggregate component common to all firms in period t, gs,t is a sector-
period specific component common to all firms in sector s in period t, gE is an
individual firm effect specific to each firm, and gID is a time varying and firm specific
component.
The object we are interested in is the volatility of the idiosyncratic component
gIDt . In particular, we are interested in its variance and how this moment changes
through time.
Let's assume that the idiosyncratic component of the real sales growth rate has
an unconditional mean of zero, and that both the idiosyncratic and the individual
components are orthogonal to the aggregate and sector specific components. That is,
E [D] = 0 (2.2)
E [(at + gs,t) . g,] = E [(at + gs,t) gE] = 0 (2.3)
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The unconditional variance of the idiosyncratic component is E [gID]2, where the
expectations operator is over the possible realizations of the stochastic process.
For long periods of time, the assumption that gIE is time invariant might not
be a realistic assumption (e.g.: under the presence of a deterministic trend for a
significant period of time). To capture possible changes in individual components,
I allow for slow moving changes in giE. In particular, I arbitrarily model this slow
moving component as follows:
t+w
gIE = E (gi,8 r - gr, - g,) (2.4)2w + 1 r=t-w
Where w is a constant and w > 0
2.2.1.2 Cross-section level
Let's assume that each cross-section is populated by a large number of firms nt, with
a large number of firms n8,t in each sector s, and that the idiosyncratic component
within the cross-section is independent for each firm. In addition, let's assume that
the unconditional variance of the idiosyncratic component is common to all firms
within the cross-section. This last assumption implies:
gE [t ] tID (2.5)
2.2.2 An estimator for a2 ID
2.2.2.1 Estimator 8t2 ID
Let's define the estimator 8t2 ID as follows.
t = 1 [ ID] (2.6)
Nt vi t
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Where Nt < nt is a sample from the total number of firms nt, Vi refer for all firms in
the sample Nt, and
ID= --st- )giet = (gi,,,t §t O §,t i't (2.7)
and
1 Nt
gt + ,t = N,- E gist
-t -=1
(2.8)
where Ns,t is the number of firms in sector s for each cross-sectional sample t, and
1 t+w
- gi,2w + 1 t-w gr2wT1r=t-w
(2.9)
Where w is a constant and w > 0.
2.2.2.2 Consistency of &t2 ID
To study the consistency of the estimator t2 ID, let's start by replacing equation (2.1)
into equation (2.7) and rewriting IDt as follows:
ID = ID + (NID TNID)N sD,  g, + as,t , t )s It
NiCD 2
i,s,t )
NID E and ^NID ^ IEWhere 9i,,t = t + gst + gt and 9s= t s,t gi,t
It follows that,
[gst]2 = [gis,t] + 2[giDst](gNID - I) + -IDZ's Is Z's ~~~~,is,t % g,s,t
(2.10)
(2.11)
and that,
&t2 ID = I E[g,t] 2
t Vi
+ 2 1
+2-
D t]NID
Egi,8, I[9i~s~t gi,s,t¥i
-_ gNIDt ) + E (gNID
Nt¥i
As detailed in Appendix 2.A.1, we can show that the first term in (2.12) converges
to t2 ID as Nt -- coo, and that the last two terms converge to zero as Nt oo. That
is,
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NID) 2
- i,s,t) (2.12)
lim I2D = aID [2 ID , aID] (2.13)
2.3 Idiosyncratic Volatility of US Listed Firms
2.3.1 Data and sample
I use the Compustat Database sample that contains annual balance sheet data for
US listed firms from 1950 to 2004. The annual real sales growth rate is constructed
using the annual sales reported in each firm's income statement (deflated using US
Producer Price Index).
The full sample contains 229,384 valid observations for real sales growth rate, for
an average of 5,097 observations per year (576 in 1951 and 5,445 in 2004). This
sample includes only positive observations of sales for firms located in the US. To
avoid changes in sales due to mergers, the sample excludes year-firm sales observations
affected by mergers and acquisitions. To reduce the influence of outliers, which could
be due to extreme observations or measurement error, I Winsorize the first and ninety-
ninth percentile-computed from the whole sample of non-international firms, which
implies that only 1.39% of valid observations are removed. Finally, and to avoid a
downward bias on the estimation of firms' idiosyncratic volatility g!Dt, observations
in year-sectors with less than 6 observations are removed from the sample-they
corresponds to 0.54% of valid observations. Sectors are defined based on the 2-digit
SIC classification.
I use a window of 7 years to compute the individual firm effect ^it (w=3 in
equation 2.9). Since the sample is an unbalanced panel, there is no information on
the corresponding 7 years for all year-firm observations. For the computation of ID
I use only year-firm observations with no less than 4 out of 7 years of information.
This implies that 7.65% of valid observations are not used in the estimation of gID-
one out of five correspond to observations within the period 2002-4. Table Al in the
Appendix 2.A.2 reports the sample composition per year used in the computations.
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Panel A (left) of Figure 2.2 plots the time series for the estimator of firms' idiosyn-
cratic volatility gI~ t., ,
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Figure 2.2.
The estimate of firms' idiosyncratic volatility presented in this paper is consistent
with the empirical literature that finds a positive trend in firms' idiosyncratic volatil-
ity. In particular, panel B (right) of Figure 2.2 analyzes the parallels between the
series constructed in this paper and the one reported in Comin and Philipp on (2005).
Notice however, that the scale of both series is significantly different. Since I argue
that gI~,t is a consistent estimator of firms' idiosyncratic volatility, it is worthwhile
exploring the differences between these two approaches. The difference between the
cross sectional view and the time series view can also be noted in the graphs presented
in Davis et ai. (2006).
We should point out the sample used is not behind the difference reported. Panel
A of Figure 2.3 shows the estimate of Comin and Philippon's (2005) estimator using
the sample used in this paper to compute gI~ t. The original series reported in Comin, ,
and Philippon (2005) and the one estimated with the sample used in this paper are
consistent.
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Figure 2.3.
Panel B of Figure 2.3 provides insight about the source of the above mentioned
difference. The top line is the series constructed based on the cross-sectional disper-
sions without any aggregate, sectoral, nor individual-effect adjustment (equivalent
to the cross-sectional estimate in Davis et at. 2006). The bottom line is the series
constructed by Comin and Philipp on (2005). On average, the former estimate is
169% higher that the latter. The second series from top to bottom is the estimate
of gl9-which accounts for aggregate, sectoral, and individual-effect adjustment in,
order to eliminate dependence between the cross-sectional observations-and the sec-
ond series from bot tom to top is the estimator used in Comin and Phili ppon (2005),
but computing the mean observation within each cross-section instead of the median
observation as Comin and Philippon (2005) do-computing the mean-version is more
consistent with the estimator gI,9.
Although the gap is not closed completely when comparing the adjusted cross-
sectional estimate with the mean version of Comin and Phili ppon (2005), the unac-
counted difference is now 39%. This result makes us more confident on the degree of
consistency of gl~ t, and as the graphs show, on its changes through time. 4, ,
For the rest of the paper I will concentrate the analysis on the adjusted cross-
sectional estimator of firms' idiosyncratic volatility (i. e.: gI~,t).
4It is still worthwhile to continue to explore the sources of this 39% gap, which can help us to
have a more accurate estimate of firms' idiosyncratic volatility.
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2.4 Long-run Relationship between Idiosyncratic
and Aggregate Volatility
As detailed in section 2.1 there is a rich set of theories that suggest a negative relation-
ship between microeconomic volatility and macro aggregate volatility. The empirical
literature has addressed this issue by constructing measures of idiosyncratic volatility,
but has not formally tested the implied relationship with aggregate volatility.
In this section, I formally test for the present of a long-run relationship between
aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility during the period 1951-2004. I borrow
from McConnell and Perez-Quiros' (2000) methodology to compute a measure of
aggregate volatility that does not depend on a rolling window and I use the estimator
gist as a measure of idiosyncratic volatility. The aggregate volatility measure is
constructed as follows. I estimate an AR(1) model for the real growth rate of private
GDP-aggregate real GDP minus government real consumption and government real
gross investment. I compute the aggregate volatility measure as the absolute value
of the estimated residual.
I use two different types of tests for testing long-run relationships. The first one,
which I use more intensively, is Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin's (1999) ARDL
approach to long-run modeling. This test has the nice feature that it estimates
consistent long-run relationship independently of whether the variable of interest
are integrated or stationary. The second one is Johansen (1988) and Johansen and
Juselius' (1990) cointegration test, which estimates long-run relationships among only
integrated series. I use the latter as supporting evidence in the first set of estimates.
After this, I stick to the Pesaran and Shin's (1999) methodology because of the known
problems in determining the nonstationary characteristics of time series. 5 6
5See Loayza and Ranciere (2006) for an excellent description of the ARDL approach to long-run
modeling.
6 The ARDL results are based on a ARDL(2,1) which implies the following error correction model;
Yt represents the level of aggregate volatility in period t and xt represents the level of idiosyncratic
volatility.
At = Y1AYt-1+ 2Axt + a[yt-1 -o - lt-1] + At
The cointegration analysis is based on an error correction model with one lag; zt = [t xt].
Zt = 1AZt-1 + c[t-1 -0 - ]1Xt-1] + Vt
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I use the test proposed in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to test for structural breaks
in each series; this test estimate an optimal break-date. I complement the analysis
with hypothesis tests on the null hypothesis of joint-contemporaneous breaks in both
series. The details of the hypothesis tests are described in Appendix 2.A.3. 7
2.4.1 Full sample
2.4.1.1 Long-run relationship
Table 1 presents the results of the tests on the long-run relationship between aggregate
volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. The period covered by the estimation is 1951-
2004. The main conclusions are summarized in Empirical Result 1.
Empirical Result 1. I reject the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship be-
tween aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility (full sample estimate). The estimated
negative long-run relationship goes in the direction predicted by both types of theories,
competition-based and diversification-based theories. The magnitude of the long-run
coefficients implies that a 100 basis point increase in idiosyncratic volatility is asso-
ciated with approximately a 11 basis point lower aggregate volatility. 8
7I am going to assume that the series present at most one structural change.
8A likelihood ratio test is used to test for the significance of the long-run parameters in the
cointegration equation (part 2 in Table 1). This test is performed by comparing the likelihood of
the error correction model estimated for Ayt (unrestricted model) and the likelihood of the model
Ayt = A1 + A1At-I + A2 Yt-1 + vt estimated by OLS (restricted model).
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Table 1: Long-Run Relationship between Idiosyncratic
and Aggregate Volatility (1951-2004)
Idiosyncratic Aggregate
Volatility Volatility
1.- ARDL approach to long-run modeling (Pesaran-Shin-Smith):
Long-run equation coefficients -0.110 1.00
Ho: = 0 (SE) (0.022)**
2.- Cointegration analysis (Johansen-Juselius):
Ho: None CE (LR-statistic) 39.29**
Ho: At most 1 CE (LR-statistic) 3.56
Cointegration coefficients -0.115 1.00
Ho: 3 = 0 (LR-Test dof=2) 14.25**
2.4.2 Structural break
Table 2 presents the result for the structural break tests; the break-date is defined as
the last period of the old regime.
Empirical Result 2. I reject the null hypothesis of no structural change for both
series. The estimated optimal break is 1984 for the aggregate volatility series and
1980 for the idiosyncratic volatility series (full sample estimate). I reject the null
that the break in aggregate volatility occurred in 1980 against the alternative that
it occurred in 1984. I also reject the null that the break in idiosyncratic volatility
occurred in 1984 against the alternative that it occurred in 1980. As well, I reject the
null that both series had a joint-contemporaneous break in 1980, or in 1984, against
the alternative that the breaks occurred at the optimal dates (idiosyncratic volatility
break in 1980 and aggregate volatility break in 1984).
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Table 2: Structural Break (1951-2004)
Idiosyncratic Aggregate
Volatility Volatility
1.- Univariate structural break analysis I (Bia-Perron):
Test of structural break (supF-statistic) 33.59** 20.19**
Estimated year of break 1980 1984
2.- Univariate structural break analysis II:
H0 : 1980 Break; H1: 1984 Break : - 4.36*
Ho: 1984 Break; H1: 1980 Break : 15.41**
t(LR-Test dof=1)
3.- Test of contemporaneous break (d):
Year of Break under H0 1984 1984
Year of Break under H1 1980 1984
Log-Likelihood Ratio Test (dof=1) 10.02**
Year of Break under H0 1980 1980
Year of Break under H1 1980 1984
Log-Likelihood Ratio Test (dof=1) 6.22*
Note: (a) Statistic in parenthesis; (b)* rejects Ho at 5%, ** rejects Ho at 1%; (c) LR: likelihood
ratio; (d) aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility are standardized using the formula xit- forSi
i =aggregate, idiosyncratic; (e) critical values for X(1,o.05) = 3.84 and X,.1) 6.63.
2.4.3 Sample issues
The empirical literature in various fields has identified a potential sample problem
of time series aggregates based on the Compustat sample. The continuing entry of
new firms into the stock market implies that the estimate of ID could be driven by
changes in the sample composition.
I study this issue with a simple, but enlightening exercise. In order to construct
a more stable sample from where to draw conclusions about the evolution of firms'
idiosyncratic volatility, I estimate gID for two disjoint subsamples: i) each year's top-
500 firms according to their level of sales and ii) the rest of the firms in the stock
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market. Panel A in Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the idiosyncratic volatility for
each subsample and for the whole sample as well. Panel B shows the series for the
top-500 firms and a filtered version (:i:3 years moving average).
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Figure 2.4.
I apply Pesaran and Shin's long-run relationship test to study the relationship
between aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility of the top-500 firms. The
coefficient of the top-500 idiosyncratic volatility variable in the long-run equation is
-0.050 with a standard error of 0.057 (insignificantly different from zero).
Empirical Result 3. The increased idiosyncratic volatility suggested by the analysis
of the full sample, does not apply uniformly across different types of firms. In partic-
ular, the idiosyncratic volatility has not increase among the top-500 firms during the
last 5 decades. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship
between aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility of the top-500 firms.
Figure 2.5 studies the stability of the subsample containing the top-500 firms.
Panel A plots the share of total sales in the full sample represented by each subsam-
pIe. Panel B analyzes the survival rate of firms among the top-500 subsample. The
top line is the number of firms in the top-500 firms subsample that are also present in
the top-500 subsample one year before; the middle (lower) line does a similar analysis
but for firms present in the top-500 subsample 5 (10) years before. In 10 years, more
than half of the firms still remain in the top-500 subsample.
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Figure 2.5.
Finally, I compute idiosyncratic volatility based on the top-500 subsample within
manufacturing firms. This sector is more homogeneous than the full sample, and
although its share of total sales has decreased over time, it continues to represent at
least 35% of all US listed firms. Similarly, it is expected that this subsample con-
tains fewer holding-type firms. This type of firms can distort the top-500 analysis
because they tend to concentrate a more diversified portfolio of production process
than producing-type firms. The results for the manufacturing subsample are shown
in Figure 2.6 and they also suggest that the volatility of all individual firms has not
increased during the last decade. The survival characteristics of the top-500 subsam-
pIe for the manufacturing sector are very similar to the ones pictured in panel B of
Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.6.
The volatility of the top-500 manufacturing subsample does not present an upper
trend and is consistent with the results for the top-500 firms.
2.4.4 Idiosyncratic volatility of new firms
The subsam pIe of non- top-500 firms is characterized by much younger firms than the
top-500 subsample-I define year 0 as the year in which the firm entered the market.
It is well known that new firms tend to be more volatile than more mature firms.
Figure 2.7 shows that the number and importance of new firms has not been
increasing throughout the last decades. Nor there has been any sharp changes in
the number and importance of new firms around the year 1984 (year of the Great
Moderation; vertical line).
I apply Pesaran and Shin's long-run relationship test to study the relationship
between idiosyncratic volatility (full sample) and number of new firms entering the
stock market. The coefficient of the number of new firms in the long-run equation is
3.09 with a standard error of 5.82 (insignificantly different from zero). If we use the
importance of new firms (sales) instead of the number of new firms, the coefficient in
the long-run equation is -3.96 with a standard error of 4.83 (insignificantly different
from zero).
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Figure 2.7. New firms in period t are defined as firms for which the first
available observation in Compustat is in period t. The share is over the
total number of firms in period t and sum of all firms' sales in period t,
respecti vely.
Although the number and importance of new firms did not change significantly
during the last 5 decades, the characteristics of the new firms entering the market
did change during the last decades. This evolution is characterized in Figures 2.8 and
2.10. Table 3 presents formal analysis regarding the long-run relationship between
new firms' characteristics and idiosyncratic volatility (full sample).
Figure 2.8 shows time series for the idiosyncratic volatility of subsamples of firms
according to the period in which these fims entered the stock market. For example,
the thick line in the left panel represents the idiosyncratic volatility of the subsample
of firms that entered the market between 1962 and 1969. Period 0 represents the last
year of the cohort (e.g.: 1969 for the cohort 1962-1969, 1985 for the cohort 1978-85,
etc.). Figure 2.9 shows the relative importance of each cohort across time as measured
by their share of total sales.
The idiosyncratic volatility of each cohort tends to decrease with time, as ex-
pected. Across cohort, the picture reveals an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility
of new firms entering after 1977. Figure 2.10 studies this in more detail.
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The sample cohorts in Figure 2.10 have a smaller range of 4 years instead of 8
years. Each bar is the average idiosyncratic volatility observed between the years in-
dicated in the X-axis for the corresponding cohort. The shaded columns correspond
to cohorts of firms entering the stock market after 1977. During the first 4 years in
the market) the volatility of firms entering after 1977 is 200 basis points higher than
the volatility in the first 4 years of firms entering before 1978 (+60% higher). Even
after being 15 years in the stock market) the difference in volatility is no less than
130 basis points (+60% higher).
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Table 3 formally tests for the long-run relationship between the volatilityof the
entering firms, which I am going to calljust-born firms, and the measures of idiosyn-
cratic volatility(fullsample). I define the idiosyncratic volatilityof just-born firms in
period t as the risk associated to allfirms in period t that entered the stock market
on period t - 3, t - 2 or t - 1 (the firstgrowth observation is in period t - 2, t - 1 or
t).
Table 3: Long-Run Relationship between Full Sample and
Just-Born Firms' Idiosyncratic Volatility (1955-2004)
Idiosyncratic
Volatility
Just-Born
Volatility
0.530
(0.104)**
1.- ARDL approach to long-run modeling (Pesaran-Shin-Smith):
Long-run equation coefficients 1.00
Ho: f3 = 0 (SE)
2.- Univariate structural break analysis (Bia-Perron):
Test of structural break (supF -statistic) 33.59**
Estimated year of break 1980
Note: (a)* rejects Ho at 5%, ** rejects Ho at 1%; (b) SE: Standard error.
29.56**
1979
Empirical Result 4. During the last 5 decades, there is no long-run relationship
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between the number, or importance (in sales), of new firms entering the stock market
and the level of idiosyncratic volatility (full sample). However, there is a long-run
relationship between the level of risk implicit in the new firms entering the market
and the level of idiosyncratic volatility (full sample). In fact, the firms that entered
the stock market after 1977 show a significantly higher level of idiosyncratic volatility
compared to the firms that entered before 1974. This difference lasts at least 15 years
after the firms entered the market. The cohort of firms entering the market between
the years 1974-1977 seem to be in a middle ground with low levels of risk until the
end of the 70's and then catching-up with the firms that entered after 1977.
We have concentrated so far in the evolution of the new firms. However, the
picture would not be complete if we did not have a measure of the implicit risk
associated to the firms that are exiting the market. It could be that the risk and the
magnitude of exiting firms compensate the documented increase in volatility of new
firms.
To address this issue, I estimate a measure of the implicit associated risk of just-
born firms and soon-to-die firms. I define the idiosyncratic volatility of soon-to-die
firms in period t as the risk associated to all firms in period t that exit the stock
market on period t, t + 1 or t + 2. I use the same definition of just-born firms
as before. 9
Panel A in Figure 2.11 shows the evolution of just-born and soon-to-die firms'
idiosyncratic volatility. The risk level of the soon-to-die firms is not higher than
the risk associated to the just-born firms. In fact, after the mid 70's a positive gap
appears in favor of the just-born firms. Also, I compute the importance of the total
sales in each subgroup with respect to the total sales of all the firms in the sample.
Panel B in Figure 2.11 shows that the amount of sales represented by the soon-to-die
firms has never been significantly higher than the sales of the just-born firms, except
around the year 2000. 10
l°The total sales series for the soon-to-die firms in Panel B of Figure 2.11 has been lagged 3
periods. This is done to create a more accurate picture of the "magnitude of sales" entering and
exiting the market in each period.
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Empirical Result 5. The idiosyncratic volatility and the importance (in sales) of
exiting firms does not compensate the increase in the volatility of new firms entering
the stock market.
2.4.5 Macro stabilization policies
Finally, I study the long run relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatil-
ity controlling for changes in the macro policy variables. Changes in the inflation rate
and in fiscal behavior can be potential explanations of the great moderation since they
can affect the macro stability of the economy.
Table 4 show the estimates for the long-run equation. The fiscal volatility vari-
able is computed in a similar fashion to aggregate volatility using real government
expenditures growth rate deflated by the CPI. Inflation rate is computed using the
CPI.
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Table 4: Long-Run Relationship between Idiosyncratic,
Aggregate Volatility, and policy variables (1951-2004)
Idiosyncratic Inflation Fiscal Aggregate
Volatility Volatility Volatility
1.- ARDL approach to long-run modeling (Pesaran-Shin-Smith):
Long-run equation coefficients -0.113 0.096 0.004 1.00
H0 : = 0 (SE) (0.021)** (0.0561)* (0.161)
Note: (a)* rejects Ho at 5%, ** rejects Ho at 1%; (b) SE: Standard error.
Empirical Result 6. When controlling for the level of inflation and the level of
fiscal volatility, the estimated long run relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic
volatility still holds. The coefficient of the inflation variable is statistically significant
(at 5o), while the coefficient of fiscal volatility is insignificantly different from zero.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship between firm-
level micro volatility and macro aggregate volatility.
The main results reveal that there has been an increase in the average volatility
of US listed firms during the last decades, and that it is negatively related in the long
run to aggregate volatility. The increase in idiosyncratic volatility has not occurred
in all types of firms. In particular, the top-500 firms (according to sales) do not show
any trend nor evidence of a long-run relationship with aggregate volatility during the
last 5 decades.
Regarding new firms, there is no trend in the number and importance of new
firms entering the stock market-we cannot associate the increase in idiosyncratic
volatility with more new firms in the market. What we do observe, however, is a
significantly higher idiosyncratic volatility of new firms entering the stock market at
the end of the 70's-not more new firms, but more risky new firms. This increase
is not compensated by an increase in risk and magnitude of firms exiting the stock
market.
Finally, when controlling for macro policies-inflation and fiscal volatility-the
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long run relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility still holds.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Consistency of &2 ID
Let's analyze separately each of the 3 terms in equation (2.12).
First term:
With respect to the first term, we know from (2.5) that E [gID] 2 = t2 ID. Applying
tthe law of large numbers, we can state that- - ' .Apthe law of large numbers, we can state that
E11N [g,t o'
t i,s
(2.14)
Second term:
With respect to the second term, we can rewrite
(NID - NID ) = +g,- t i,I,tj g8 t + g!i:) - (t + 9St + 9iE)
1 Nat
9i,s,t= N
s8,t =l
(gt + g,t + git + gD) =
(gt NI 1
i( 1t E Nt
Na,t
E (giI + g) =
i=1l
1 Na,t
(g+gt) + 9s E(, + 9,t)i1
From equation (2.2) we know that N E=_ t(gIE+gID) and
0. Therefore,
gt + 9s,t gt + gs,t
As well, we can write
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and
1 N,t
9t + 9s,t = N,, E
t i=1
(2.15)
(2.16)
_l nst '(gIE+gID) =ns,t Zi=l it Yit):
(2.17)
1 t+w
i 2w + 1 =t-w ((g + gs,r + 9g + )9r - , - , ,) =
1 t+w
2w9 + 1 9i g +g+
r=t-w
1 t+w
2w+1 wr~t--w
(gr + gs,r - r - ,r) =
1 t+w
g + 2w + 1 r=-w
r=t--w
(gr + ,r- r- ,r)
Based on the latter formulation, when Nt - oo we can write
NID NID) 0
--zS' Yi's't '-0
and
gID . (gNID - §NID) 0
~~~~~~~~andst - st
and
gI . gNID _ .iNID'I ]Z~E [g. (g,, - t
Applying the law of large numbers, we can state that
21 ID I(gt] NI
kg,a,Nt vi,,, Is
- NID) -P 0
-Yi , t ]
Third term:
/giNID - §NID) NID-With respect to the third term, remember that (gNus - YI,] 0 and E (gi, -
i,t ) - 0 As a result,
(2.23)t EV (gistNt vi / ""I::t
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(2.18)
(2.19)
(2.20)
(2.21)
(2.22)
NID)2 P O
9z'8't
Finally, based on equations (2.14), (2.22), and (2.23) we can state that
lim &t2 ID = D
Nt-oo
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(2.24)[&t2 ID P I OtID]
2.A.2 Sample composition
Tale Al: Sample Composition
Year Number of Firms Year Number of Firms
1951 576 1978 5,278
1952 714 1979 5,104
1953 721 1980 5,038
1954 728 1981 4,990
1955 747 1982 4,979
1956 759 1983 5,036
1957 777 1984 5,044
1958 800 1985 5,038
1959 866 1986 5,102
1960 908 1987 5,329
1961 1,687 1988 5,399
1962 1,841 1989 5,392
1963 2,088 1990 5,427
1964 2,344 1991 5,475
1965 2,515 1992 5,511
1966 2,701 1993 5,594
1967 2,876 1994 6,061
1968 3,069 1995 6,163
1969 3,299 1996 6,391
1970 3,410 1997 6,450
1971 3,487 1998 6,106
1972 3,633 1999 6,152
1973 3,729 2000 6,121
1974 3,916 2001 6,042
1975 5,255 2002 5,628
1976 5,339 2003 5,042
1977 5,267 2004 3,893
Total 211,837
Note: Number of firms in each period in the sample used to compute
the results presented in this paper.
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2.A.3 Hypothesis tests of structural break
The first set of estimates in Table 2 tests the null hypothesis of no structural break
against the hypothesis of a structural beak at an unknown period. These tests are
based on Bia and Perron (1998, 2003) and they also estimate the optimal break-
period.
The second set of hypotheses tests studies the null hypothesis (H0 ) that each
univariate series had a structural break in the period where the other series had
its optimal break. The null hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis
(Hi) that the break occurred in the optimal period estimated for each series. These
hypotheses are tested with log likelihood ratio tests based on the following model.
Yt = 01 + A 1D 84 + A2 D80 (2.25)
where yt is the corresponding series (either aggregate or idiosyncratic volatility); DT
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if t > T. For the idiosyncratic volatility
series, the null hypothesis corresponds to the case where A2 = 0, while the alternative
corresponds to the case where A = 0. The opposite configuration holds for the
aggregate volatility series.
The third set of estimates tests the null hypothesis of joint-contemporaneous
break-that both series had a common break either in 1980 or 1984-against the
alternative that each series had its break in their estimated optimal break date. The
null hypothesis that both series had a break in 1984 is tested with a log likelihood
ratio tests based on the following model:
zit = O1DA + 02DI + A1DAD84 + A2 DID84 + A3DID8 0 + i (2.26)
where zt is a variable with the aggregate (A) and idiosyncratic (I) variables stacked
(for i = A, B); Di is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the observations
corresponding to the series i (for i = A, B); DT is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 in periods t > T. The A3 = 0 case corresponds to the null hypothesis that
both breaks occurred in 1984, while the 2 = 0 case corresponds to the alternative
hypothesis that the breaks occurred at each individual optimal date.
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The test for the null hypothesis of joint structural break in 1980 is analogous and
it is based on the following model:
zit = 1DA + 02D, + A1DAD8so + A2 DID80 + A3DAD84 + 1 (2.27)
whereH 0 : A3 = 0 and H1 : A = 0.
Finally, the variables in zit are standardized using the formula -- for i = A, B,Si
where S = k EN 1 (xi,t - i)° 5. If we do not standardized the measures of volatility,N =l
then difference in the standard deviation of the series will mechanically bias the result
in favor to the optimal date of the variable with higher variance. In this case, in favor
of the optimal date of the idiosyncratic volatility series that has a standard deviation
almost 4 times higher than the standard deviation of the aggregate volatility series.
In fact, when I do the test under no standardization, I cannot reject the null of a
joint-contemporaneous break in 1980 (p-value of 28%).
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Chapter 3
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Biases
under Lack of Coordination
"The most recent [Polish] parliament added recklessly to spending. This has
led to an awkward stand-off with the central bank, whose governor, Leszek
Balcerowicz, was the father of shock therapy when he was finance minister in
1990. Mr Balcerowicz and his colleagues at the bank say interest rates will
have to stay high ... until the politicians can demonstrate fiscally responsible
behaviour. Ministers complain that the central bank is strangling growth."
(Limping towards Normality, Oct. 25th, 2001, The Economist.)
Until not so long ago, the debate on the relationship between monetary and fis-
cal authorities has been centered on the inflationary consequences of the monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit. The moderately high inflation of the 1970s in some
industrialized countries and, particularly, the recurring episodes of very high inflation
in several developing countries justified this focus. The main policy recommendation
to avoid high and variable inflation has been the institution of an independent mone-
tary authority whose main mandate would be to ensure price stability (see Cukierman
1992, and Walsh 1993). In fact, in recent years several central banks have adopted
inflation targeting as the cornerstone of their monetary policy (see Bernanke et al.
1999).
A second policy recommendation has been to impose discipline in the fiscal ac-
counts and reduce the public deficit. This has been achieved by both rationalizing
fiscal expenditures (e.g., eliminating price subsidies and privatizing public enterprises)
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and raising tax revenues, particularly through the adoption of value-added taxes. Fur-
thermore, fiscal authorities are using domestic and international financial markets to
better manage the public debt to avoid the need to collect seignorage from outstand-
ing monetary assets.
Thus, in many countries around the world there is a new policy environment,
one in which monetary authorities are committed to controlling inflation and fiscal
authorities do not rely on the inflationary tax to finance their deficits and debt service.
In this new context, a different set of policy issues and questions arise. This paper is
devoted to the study of one of the most important of them, namely, the effect of the
lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities in achieving the goals of
minimizing business cycle fluctuations.
Coordination (or the lack thereof) is a relevant issue because the monetary and
fiscal authorities have different policy instruments, different objectives and prefer-
ences, and sometimes different perceptions of how the economy functions. These
differences can lead both authorities to behave antagonistically and produce undesir-
able results in the economy. Following Nordhaus (1994) and Loewy (1988), we use
a game-theoretic approach to analyze the effects of the lack of policy coordination
between fiscal and monetary authorites on public deficits and domestic real interest
rates. We then test the main implications of the model using a sample of 19 industrial
countries over the period 1970-94.
In order to illustrate the main ideas of the paper, let's consider a simple fiscal-
monetary game modeled after the well-known "prisoner's dilemma." Figure 1 presents
the main assumptions and results of this game. We analyze the potential response of
the monetary and fiscal authorities in the face of a negative shock that rises inflation
and lowers employment. The monetary and fiscal authorities have two options to
confront a negative supply shock: they can either follow loose or tight policies. When
both "play" tight, the resulting inflation is low but so is the resulting employment.
When both play loose, both inflation and employment are high. And when only one
of them plays tight, the result is medium employment and inflation.
The distinctive feature of this fiscal/monetary game is that monetary and fiscal
authorities have different preferences for inflation and employment (see the payoff
schedules in Figure 1). Whereas the monetary authority considers more valuable to
achieve low inflation than high employment, the fiscal authority regards obtaining
high employment as more important than keeping inflation low. The preference dif-
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Figure 1: A Monetary-Fiscal Game
Central Bank
Tight Monetary Loose Monetary
Payoff Schedules
Inflation Low Medium High
Central Bank 6 4 1
Fiscal Authority 3 2 1
Employment Low Medium High
Central Bank 1 2 3
Fiscal Authority 1 4 6
ferences between both authorities are chosen
the result we would like to stress.
to be sufficiently large so as to obtain
The only Nash equilibrium in this game consists of a tight monetary policy and a
loose fiscal policy. The other three alternatives present opportunities for one of the
players to benefit by unilaterally deviating from the original play. The equilibrium
of this game exposes the paradigmatic conservatism of central banks and liberalism
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Tight
Fiscal
Fiscal
Authority
Loose
Fiscal
[I] Li
S ~ Low Inflation 2- Medium Inflation
Low Employment Medium Employment
El Medium Inflation m High Inflation
Medium Employment High Employment
of fiscal authorities. It also illustrates why their responses are optimal given the
preference differences between the two. For instance, if the monetary authority were
to follow a loose policy -believing fiscal authority's assurance for stricter restraint-,
then the fiscal authority would find it optimal to renege its pledge and play a loose
policy. Note that in terms of the payoffs to both authorities, the Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to the combination of loose monetary and tight fiscal policies. From a long-
run perspective, it can be argued that the latter combination of policies is healthier
than the Nash equilibrium given that it does not compromise fiscal sustainability and
does not weaken the investment capacity of the private sector.
In the second section of the paper we formalize these ideas through a monetary-
fiscal game, clarifying the conditions under which looser fiscal policy (represented by
higher primary fiscal deficits) is accompanied by tighter monetary policy(represented
by higher real interest rates), as predicted by the "prisoner's dilemma" game. The
basic conclusion of the model is that if the preferences for output and inflation gaps
become more dissimilar between the monetary and fiscal authorities, then the primary
fiscal deficit and real interest rate will rise by a larger amount in the face of economic
shocks.
Also in the theoretical section, we compare the Nash equilibrium solution with the
Stackelberg solution. By allowing one of the authorities to be the leader, the Stackel-
berg solution introduces dynamic aspects into the game. It creates the possibility for
the leading authority to act in a way that elicits a mutually beneficial response from
the follower. The Stackelberg game gives the same qualitative conclusion as the Nash
equilibrium; however, due to its potential for beneficial interaction, the Stackelberg
equilibrium renders lower policy biases -that is, lower fiscal deficits and interest rates
in the face of shocks.
The third section of the paper bring some empirical evidence to bear. We use an-
nual information over the period 1970-94 for a sample of industrial countries to test
the main conclusion of the paper: in a context where fiscal and monetary authorities
are independent and do not effectively coordinate their policy responses, countries
where the fiscal and monetary authorities are more divergent regarding their pref-
erences for output and inflation gaps will exhibit larger primary deficits and real
interest rates. Given the highly simplified nature of our game-theoretic model, this
conclusion would apply only after controlling for other factors affecting the level of
primary deficits and domestic real interest rates.
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We run a system of reduced-form regressions with the primary deficit (as ratio to
GDP) and the real domestic interest rate (as deviation from the international interest
rate) as dependent variables. We proxy the central bank's relative preference in favor
of reducing inflation deviations by an indicator of the importance of price stability in
the central bank's charter. Likewise, we proxy the fiscal authority's relative preference
in favor of reducing the output gap by an index of political orientation of the party in
power. In these regressions we control for a number of factors that may be correlated
with the dependent variables, such as business cycle effects, international conditions,
and Ricardian-equivalence effects. We find evidence robustly consistent with the main
conclusion of the theoretical model.
The policy implication we derive from these results is that, notwithstanding the
gains from central bank independence, there are gains to be made from policy coor-
dination between monetary and fiscal authorities. However, this implication would
apply only to countries that have already achieved price stability and fiscal discipline.
3.1 A Game-Theoretic Model
This section presents a one-period game played by monetary and fiscal authorities.
It builds from the trade-off that the economy faces in the short-run between changes
in the inflation rate and the output gap (Phillips Curve). The model emphasizes the
effects on the level of fiscal deficits and real interest rates that result from different
preferences by the monetary and fiscal authorities with respect to inflation and output
deviations from their optimal level.
This game-theoretic approach is based on Frankel (1988), Loewy (1988) and Nord-
haus (1994). The main difference between Frankel's model and ours is that Frankel
assumes a world where the authorities have the same preference with respect to in-
flation and output deviations but disagree on the model that best represents the
economy. 1 Our model is similar to Nordhaus', with the difference that we assume
asymmetric preferences for negative and positive changes of inflation and output, we
allow for both authorities to be reluctant to change their policy instruments, and we
compare the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria results.
1Frankel concludes that policy coordination may not be welfare improving if it means a departure
from the "true" model. However, coordination would be more likely to be welfare improving if it
means sharing information and agreeing on a common model for the economy.
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3.1.1 The model
We assume that policy makers seek to maximize an asymmetric utility function. Both
fiscal and monetary authorities dislike a fall in output and a rise in inflation; however,
they do not mind the opposite. In addition, we assume that both authorities dislike
changing their respective policy instrument from its long-run level. 2
The fiscal authority's utility function is denoted by UF and the unnormalized
preference weights for each objective are given by the coefficients cF, uF and u
(equation 3.1). They measure respectively the cost associated to output (y) falling
below a certain threshold (y*), to inflation (r) rising beyond its long-run level (7r*)
and to deficit deviations from its long-run level (D - D*). Note that auF, uf, Ju > 0.
Given the ordinal nature of the utility function and in order to clarify the role of the
assumptions, let's normalize the preference parameters so that they are given with
respect to the cost of inflation deviations: aF = acF/f0 and a = Ju/OuF (equation
3.2).
UF = UF (y - y*), (-r - r*), (D - D*)}
UF = -aF{min(y- y*, O) - 3uF{max(r - 7r*,O)}2 - (D- D*)2 (3.1)
UF = _aF{min(y - y*,O)}2 - {max(7r - 7r*,) 2 - 6(D- D*)2 (3.2)
The monetary authority utility function is modeled with an analogous structure
but with different preference weights, including the aversion to change its own in-
strument, the real interest rate (r), from its long-run level (equation 3.3). Let UM
represent the monetary authority's utility function and aum ,63 and u measure the
cost associated to, respectively, an output fall (min(y- y*, 0)), an inflation increase
(max(7r-7r*, 0)), and a real interest rate deviation (r-r*). Note that aM , / 3MI, 'u > 0.
Again, we need to normalize the parameters, and for convenience this time let's do
it with respect to the cost of output deviations: = /am and r = ru/amM M
(equation 3.4).
UM = UM{ (y - y*), (7r - 7r*), (r - r*)}
2 As will become clear below, working with asymmetric utility functions is important because it
prevents the cancelling out of the policy biases over time: as shocks hit the economy, the fiscal and
monetary authorities react by increasing the public deficit and the interest rate, respectively.
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UM =- aM{min(y - y*, O)}2 - ,M3'{max(r -7r*, O)}2 - T(rr*) 2 (3.3)
UM = -{min(y - y*, O)}2 - 3M{max(7r- r*, O)}2 - -r(r -r*) 2 (3.4)
As pointed out above, the key assumption of the model lies in the difference
between the monetary and fiscal authorities regarding their relative preferences for
output and inflation deviations. We want our model to reflect both the Central Bank's
mission to contain inflation and the fiscal authority's greater incentives to reduce
unemployment. Thus, we assume that the monetary authority is more affected by
inflation than output deviations. Conversely, the fiscal authority is more concerned
about output than inflation deviations. In terms of the parameters of our model,
aF = OF/F > and = /a >
We assume that the long-run levels y*,r*, D*, and r* are perceived to be the same
by both authorities.
The assumption that - > 0 reflects the fact that central banks dislike large and
sudden movements in policy interest rates. The literature on monetary policy takes
this into account by using the lagged interest rate as an argument of the policy
reaction function (see Woodford 1999 for a model that formalizes the optimality of
interest-rate smoothing rules.) Similarly, the assumption that 6 > 0 reflects the fact
that fiscal authorities dislike deviations in their instrument from an established target.
This may result from the political costs and financing difficulties involved in moving
away from an agreed-upon fiscal budget.
The forces that rule the economy are modeled as follows:
y -y = yD(D -D*) -yr(r -r*) + yO (3.5)
7 - 7 = y(y - y*)-A0 (3.6)
Equation (3.5) represents the aggregate demand function and (3.6), the aggregate
supply function (or Phillips Curve). The parameters YD and fYr represent the elas-
ticities of the output gap to the fiscal deficit and the real interest rate, respectively.
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The parameter Ay represents the elasticity of inflation to the output gap. Aggregate
demand and supply shocks are represented by Y0 and A0 , respectively. For simplicity,
wesetD*,r* = .
In what follows we concentrate on aggregate supply shocks. These are the most
interesting given that for both authorities they elicit a trade-off between restoring
output or controlling inflation. 4
The solution for the case of a positive aggregate supply shock (A0 > 0) is trivial.
This comes from the type of asymmetric loss functions that we assume. A positive
supply shock leaves inflation lower than 7r* and output higher than y*, in which case
neither authority suffer a loss and thus their is no policy response. On the other hand,
a negative supply shock lowers output and increases inflation, thus inducing a policy
reaction by both authorities. It is this case which we study in detail in the following
sections.
Given a negative supply shock, the loss functions (equations 3.2 and 3.4) can be
written as follows:
UF = _aF(y _ y)2- ( _ -*)2- 6(D - D*)2 (3.7)
UM _(Y _ *)2- M(7r- r*)2 -r(r-r*)2 (3.8)
This simplification is consistent with the resulting equilibrium level of output,
which is lower than y*, and of inflation, which is higher than 7r*. In other words, the
solution is interior to the range y < y* and 7r > 7r*n (see below).
3 A standard version of the modern Phillips Curve would look like 7r = (y - y*) + 7re - A0. If
we subtract r* from both sides we get 7r - 7r* = (y - y*)- A0 where Ao = (r* - re + A'). Our
simple model does not provide a framework to generate endogenous expectations, so 7re is taken as
an exogenous variable. Given 7r*, we treat misaligned expectations with respect to 7r* as supply
shocks (7re > 7r would be a negative supply shock).
4It can be shown that even in the presences of a demand shocks the result that an increase
in preference divergence leads to higher fiscal deficits and higher real interest rates holds. For a
reference, see Bennett and Loayza 2000.
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3.1.2 The Nash equilibrium
The relationship between fiscal and monetary authorities lies somewhere in between
complete policy coordination and none at all . The degree of coordination between
fiscal and monetary authorities varies from country to country and over time. Our
contention, however, is that a situation of lack of full coordination is the most preva-
lent when the monetary authority is independent from the central government. We
arrive at this assumption considering the difficulties to achieve successful coordina-
tion, including the obstacles to enforce commitments between independent branches
of government, the practical inability to discern outcomes due to policies from those
due to exogenous shocks, and the transaction costs of day-to-day policy harmoniza-
tion and monitoring. We model uncoordinated policy responses through a Nash game.
The concept of equilibrium that the Nash equilibrium represents is an extreme case
(no coordination at all). However it allows us to isolate the effect of uncoordinated
actions that we want to analyze.
In our monetary-fiscal game, each authority decides the level of its instrument
knowing that its counterpart is rational and has certain preferences over inflation
and output gaps. The simple Nash equilibrium applies when both players decide
simultaneously and without coordination their respective strategies. It consists of a
pair (DN,rN) characterized by the property that no player can reach a higher level
of utility by unilaterally deviating from this solution.
The Nash equilibrium is obtained when each authority maximizes its utility func-
tion with respect to its own instrument, taken the other policy instrument as given.
Maximizing the fiscal authority's utility function (eq. 3.7), and substituting the ex-
pressions for aggregate demand and supply (eqs. 3.5 and 3.6), we obtain the fiscal
reaction function (FRnFn):
OUF =
aD
FRnFn: D = 1 + [(+] Dr+ D( F-(3.9)
Similarly, maximizing the monetary authority's utility function (eq. 3.8), we ob-
5By coordination we understand the process through which two independent authorities negoti-
ate their strategies in order to improve results for both.
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tain the monetary reaction function (MRnFn):
OUM
= 0--
Or
MRnFn: D = 1 + (1) + AA) 1 /3 O ) (3.10)
-Yr'1 +O' -rD + D1M +A
Both reaction functions imply a linear relation between D and r. Comparing the
two equations we can see the following. i) The intercept of MRnFn is more negative
than the intercept of FRnFn. ii) The slope of MRnFn is higher than the slope of
the iso-aggregate demand lines (Yr/D), and this in turn is higher than the slope of
FRnFn. This results from the assumption that the monetary authority loses more
from inflation than output gaps, and conversely for the fiscal authority, as well as,
from the welfare loss to each authority because of deviations of their instrument from
its long-run level. Establishing these differences between the two reaction functions
will help us make the comparative static exercises presented below.
The intersection of MRnFn and FRnFn gives the Nash solution, as depicted in
Figure 2. After a fair amount of algebra, the Nash equilibrium solution for the deficit
and the interest rate is given by, 6
DN = - y((OzF3M _- 1)Ao + TAYAo 311D = (3.11)
~
6 /'YD(1 + 3MA2) + T6 /YD + YDT(aF + A )
_,2 , oF M -lS-pA~
rN - DyA(COFM - 1)Ao - 6MA (1)rN D Y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(3.12)
1yr6 (l + 3MA2/) + TS'/'Yr ( F + A 2)
We are now prepared to derive the central result from the theoretical model.
How will the deficit and interest rate change if the difference in relative preferences
between the two authorities becomes larger (i.e., if either F or /3 M increases)? The
6 Substituting the resulting DN and rN in the output gap equation (3.5) and in the inflation
equation (3.6), it can be seen that the equilibrium output is lower than y* and inflation higher than
r*. In other words, the solution is interior to the range y < y* and 7r > r*. Thus, it is valid to
assume that given a negative supply shock the authorities' utility function can be modeled as the
simple quadratic form of equations (3.7) and (3.8).
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answer is that both the deficit and the interest rate increase, reflecting the relatively
more extreme position taken by both authorities. This can be shown directly, though
tediously, by taking partial derivatives of DN and rN with respect to F and 3M .
More insight can be gained by deriving this result from shifts in the reaction functions.
Figure 3 illustrates the case when 3M increases: the intercept of MRnFN becomes
more negative its slope declines (reflecting the central bank's lower desired aggregate
demand level given its stronger anti-inflationary preference). As Figure 3 shows, the
new equilibrium (DN, N) will necessarily be located to the north-east of (DN,rN),
which means higher levels of both policy instruments. Likewise, if a F rises, then the
intercept of FRnFn becomes less negative and its slope increases. This also leads
unambiguously to an increase in the deficit and the interest rate. 7
3.1.3 The Stackelberg equilibrium
Whereas the Nash equilibrium is obtained when both players move simultaneously, a
sequential play of the game leads to the Stackelberg equilibrium.8 For the monetary-
fiscal game this means that one authorities decides first the magnitude of its instru-
ment and the other one follows it. We assume that the monetary authority is the
leader. The opposite case yields similar conclusions.
7An increase in the deficit or the interest rate can be characterized as a "policy bias" only if
it intensifies the departure from the long-run levels D* and r*, normalized to zero in the solution
of the model. This occurs if the Nash equilibrium for a given negative supply shock is such that
both DN and r N are positive. As can be seen from equation (3.12), this is always the case for the
interest rate; the conceptual reason is that a decrease in the interest rate with respect to r* would
increase inflation further than just the mere effect of the negative supply shock. However, from
equation (3.11) note that DN may be negative, as this carries the possibility of making the output
and inflation gaps share the burden of the supply shock. To rule out the possibility of a negative DN,
we need to impose the condition that both authorities have sufficiently strong relative preferences
over output or inflation gaps. Specifically, we assume that the condition given in equation (3.13)
holds.
aF, M - 1 > (3.13)
> Yr
The implication of this condition is fairly intuitive and appealing: if condition (3.13) does not
hold, it will imply that in the presence of a negative supply shock, the equilibrium level of inflation
with an independence central bank will be higher than the resulting equilibrium level of inflation
assuming a similar model but with the fiscal authority controlling both instruments.
8By Stackelberg equilibrium we refer only to the Nash equilibria of the sequential move-game
associated with its backward-induction outcome.
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The reaction of the follower in the Stackelberg game is the same as in the Nash
game: the fiscal reaction function, (3.9), is the optimal response of the fiscal authority
to a given interest rate decided by the leader. Thus, the follower's (fiscal) reaction
function is given by,
FRnFn: D1la r+ r [ AYAO (3.9)
'YD [l++ D(aF+A )J
The central bank's F.O.C. as the leader of the Stackelberg game is obtained by
maximizing UM with respect to r, taking into account that the central bank is now
able to affect D according to the fiscal authority's reaction function (3.9). We can
then express the monetary authority's "action" function (MAnFn) as follows,
MAnFn: D = 1 + (1 + pMA2)] r [(1 O+ )] (3.14)(D-yr2(1 + OM,\2-D(1/"O"{' \2)
where
11D +y( 7 A) < 1 (3.15)
Substituting (3.9) into (3.14), we can determine the central bank's optimal interest
rate, r. Then, given r8 the fiscal authority decides its deficit according to (3.9). The
Stackelberg solution is given by, 
Ds _ f-yA(a F,/3M _- 1)Ao + rAyAo
Ds cyr/yD(1 + O3MA2) yD + -yD(aF + ) (3.16)
rS~ -c-Ay (aF/M - 1)A0 - 5t3MAyAo (3.17)rS = D~(O 3.-)obi >17)
cI-yrS(l + BMA 2) + T6/'Yr + 7D-r/ yr(aF + 2)
How does the Stackelberg solution compare with the Nash solution? The Stack-
elberg equilibrium produces lower deficits and interest rates because the sequential
nature of the game allows the leader to elicit a more moderate response from the
follower. In fact, note that the presence of the parameter '1 in the monetary reaction
function is equivalent to an increase in the -r, the willingness of the central bank to
change its instrument. Figure 4 illustrates the comparison between the two types
9 With the same procedure used in the Nash game, it can be shown that the Stackelberg solution
is interior to the range y < y* and 7r > 7r*. Thus, it is valid to assume that given a negative supply
shock the authorities' utility function can be modeled as the simple quadratic form of equations
(3.7) and (3.8).
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of solutions. The monetary action function in the Stackelberg game has the same
intercept, but a steeper slope than the monetary reaction function in the Nash game.
Thus rendering a Stackelberg equilibrium with lower deficit and interest rate than
the Nash equilibrium.
What happens in the Stackelberg game if the difference in relative preferences
between the two authorities becomes larger? Since the preference parameters affect
the monetary and fiscal reaction functions qualitatively the same in the Stackelberg
as in the Nash games, an increase in either acF or 3 M produces larger deficits and
interest rates. The only difference is that these changes in the policy instruments
are attenuated because the sequential nature of the game acts as if signaling a lower
willingness on the part of the leader to change its instrument. 10
3.2 Empirical Evidence
The main result of the theoretical section can be presented as follows. When the
central bank's anti-inflationary stance gets stronger or the fiscal authority becomes
keener to avoid output gaps, then, in the face of a negative supply shock, the interest
rate and public deficit will be larger as each authority takes a more extreme policy
position to achieve its respective objective. In the empirical section we are interested
in testing one important implication from this result. Namely, we want to test whether
a change in the preference stance of one authority will produce a larger policy response
in the other. Naturally, there are two components to this test. The first is whether
public deficits will be larger when the monetary authority becomes more adamant
in its anti-inflationary objective. The second is whether interest rates will be higher
when the fiscal authority becomes more concerned about output gaps.
Our empirical approach will be based on cross-country and time-series compar-
isons. Then, we will be testing whether in countries and time periods where one
authority becomes more extreme in its preferences, the other's policy instrument
turns out to be stronger. In order to make valid cross-country and time-series com-
10 The condition for the equilibrium fiscal deficit in the Stackelberg game to be positive is anal-
ogous to that in the Nash equilibrium (footnote 7). For the Stackelberg case we assume that this
condition holds.
aFlM _ 1> is. (3.18)
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parisons, we need to normalize the data to make it consistent (as explained below)
and, especially, we need to control for the size of the shocks and economic conditions
that elicit government interventions in the first place. We will work under the main-
tained assumption that the fiscal and monetary reactions are not fully coordinated
and respond to different relative preferences in the countries and time periods under
consideration.
Before discussing the details of our empirical exercise, we should note that there
is another implication of the model that we will not be focusing on. This is the
implication that each authority's policy instrument responds to its own preferences.
The reason why we will not use this implication for testing the model is that each
authority's own preferences affect its instrument for a variety of reasons unrelated to
the other authority's behavior. For instance, more fiscally responsible governments
will reduce the deficit, independently of what the central bank's reaction might be.
Thus, we could not claim a deficit's reduction in the case of a less activist government
as supporting evidence for the model.
3.2.1 The empirical model
Let d be the primary deficit (properly normalized to be comparable across countries
and over time) and r the real domestic interest rate (specifically, its portion sub-
ject to changes in policy.) Then, consider the following two reduced-form regression
equations:
dt = pdXt + dfPi,t + Odmpi,t + i + ei,t (3.19)
ri,t = PrXit + rfPi,t + Ormpi,t + Hi + Ei,t (3.20)
where fp is an indicator of the fiscal authority's preference regarding its willingness
to avoid output gaps, mp is an indicator of the monetary authority's preference on
the importance of avoiding inflation, X is a set of control variables that includes a
time trend, and are unobserved country-specific effects, and the subscripts i and
t denote country and year, respectively. We assume that there is cross-country and
time-series homogeneity regarding all slope parameters.
Hypothesis test. The test of our main hypothesis is based on the sign and sig-
nificance of both d and r. If both are significantly positive, we conclude that an
increase in the preference divergence between monetary and fiscal authorities leads
to an increase in their respective policy instruments, ceteris paribus.
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Sample. We use a pooled data set of annual observations for the period 1970-94
covering most industrialized countries. Since the paper focuses on the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policies towards stabilization, we cannot use countries
where this relationship has been dominated by the inflationary finance of the fiscal
deficit. We recognize that in that case, the issues analyzed in this paper are of second
order importance. Therefore, in the empirical analysis we do not work with developing
countries or with OECD countries that have experienced relatively high inflation over
the last three decades. For this reason we have not included countries whose average
inflation rate for the period has been above 10%]; this is the case of Greece (average
inflation: 14%), Iceland (24%), Italy (10.5%), and Portugal (14%.) For the remaining
industrial countries the average inflation rate for the period has been below 10%.
The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. 
Dependent variables. For the deficit regression, the dependent variable is the ratio
of the central government's primary deficit (total deficit minus interest payments) to
GDP (obtained from Government Finance Statistics, IMF). Dividing by GDP nor-
malizes the scale (or metric) of primary deficits such that it can be used for regressions
across countries and over time. For the interest-rate regression, the dependent vari-
able is the difference between domestic and international real interest rates. We use
the deviations from the international rate to account for the fact that domestic rates
are heavily influenced by parity conditions in countries with open capital accounts.
Only the portion of domestic rates not determined by international conditions can
be regarded as the monetary authority's policy instrument. Real domestic interest
rates are obtained by deflating nominal domestic money-market rates (13-week Trea-
sury Bill Rate or its equivalent) by an average of current and next-year CPI inflation
rates (from Loayza et al. (1998)). The international real interest rate is the 13-week
nominal Eurodollar London rate adjusted accordingly with the industrial countries
average CPI (from International Financial Statistics, IMF).
Indicators for the preferences of fiscal and monetary authorities. We proxy for
the fiscal authority's preference to avoiding output gaps with a measure of the ruling
government's political orientation. Specifically, we use the Beck et al. (2000) political
institutions data base to assess the political orientation of the Chief Executive's Party
(right, center or left). We assume that parties on the left of the political spectrum have
a higher preference for reducing unemployment and the output gap than controlling
inflation, and vice versa. We constructed the indicator fp by assigning a value of 0
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to countries and years where the political orientation of the Chief Executive's Party
was defined as right, a value of 0.5 where it was defined as center, and a value of 1
where it was defined as left. Beck's et al. dataset covers 177 countries over 21 years,
1975-1995. For the period 1970-1974, we constructed the indicator using information
from Banks and Muller (1998).
We proxy for the monetary authority's preference against inflation hikes by the
formal central bank's commitment to control inflation as expressed in its charter. This
indicator is obtained from the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) cross-country
database on central bank independence and objectives. Their database contains in-
formation on most industrialized countries and many developing countries over the
period 1970-89, and we update it from central bank documents up to 1994. The
measure of interest for our purposes is the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index for the
importance of price stability as a central bank objective. They construct the index
based on explicit information contained in each central banks' charter and assign
specific values according to the following criteria: 1 if price stability is mentioned
as the only or major goal, and in case of conflict with the government, the central
bank has final authority to pursue policies aimed at achieving this goal; 0.8 if price
stability is mentioned as the only goal; 0.6 if price stability is mentioned along with
other objectives that do not seem to conflict with price stability (e.g., stable banking);
0.4 if price stability is mentioned with a number of potentially conflicting goals (e.g.,
full employment); 0.2 if central bank charter does not contain any objectives for the
central bank and 0 if some goals appear in the charter but stability is not one of them.
In a further exercise we also use the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti index of central bank
independence, (cbi), exclusive of the price-stability objective, in order to compare the
effects of central bank independence with those of central bank preference for price
stability.
We work under the notion that the preferences of monetary and fiscal authori-
ties are mainly driven by institutional and political factors and possibly as well by
economic conditions. However, we assume that these preferences are exogenous with
respect to the authorities' current policy stance. In other words, we assume that
there is no reverse causation from public deficits and interest rates to the authorities'
preferences.
Control and instrumental variables. Given that our analysis is based on the com-
parison across countries and time periods, we need to control for the economic con-
ditions and shocks that prompt a monetary or fiscal reaction in the first place. As
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summary measures for these conditions and shocks, we include the rate of GDP
growth per capita, the rate of CPI inflation, and the rate of saving as explanatory
variables 12 It is likely that these variables be endogenous with respect to the pol-
icy instruments, our dependent variables. This would not be problem in testing the
hypothesis of interest if growth, inflation, and saving were uncorrelated with the au-
thorities' preferences. However, this may not necessary be the case, and there could
be a correlation between these preferences and economic conditions. Therefore, in
some of the exercises presented below we use an instrumental-variable procedure to
isolate the exogenous components of growth, inflation, and saving. As instruments,
we use the trade-weighted average GDP growth of partner countries, the terms of
trade shocks, the level and squared of (the log of) per capita GDP, the share of the
population living in urban areas, the share of the population between the ages of
15 and 65, and the share of the population older than 65 years. The first two in-
strumental variables are mostly related to growth and inflation; the last three are
mostly related to saving; and the instruments based on per capita GDP are related
to all three explanatory variables. Data for the control and instrumental variables
are obtained from the World Development Indicators, World Bank (various years),
and Loayza et.al (1998).
As explained above, our test is based on the effect that the preferences of one of
the authorities may have on the other's policy instrument. This effect, however, is
conditional on the relative preferences of the latter. For instance, the effect that the
central bank's inflation aversion may have on the public deficit is conditional on how
averse the fiscal authority is with respect to unemployment. Therefore, although we
are concerned with the coefficient of only one of the authorities' preferences in each
regression, we must include both preference proxies as explanatory variables. Finally,
all regressions control for a common time trend, and, in most specifications, they also
control for unobserved country-specific effects.
3.2.2 Estimation and results
Table 1 is organized in three pairs of results, where each pair consists of a deficit and
an interest-rate regression. The first pair is estimated using a simple pooled OLS
methodology, where each observation is treated independently of which country it
belongs to. The second pair of regressions is estimated with a fixed-effects estimator,
2National saving in the interest-rate regression, and private saving in the deficit regression.
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whereby unobserved country-specific effects are captured by country intercepts 13. For
the third pair of regressions we still use the fixed-effects method but allow for a richer
structure of the error term; specifically, using the Newey-West procedure, we correct
the standard errors of the coefficients by allowing for country-wise heteroskedastic-
ity and MA(1) residual correlation. All results support the hypotheses implied from
the theoretical model, in the sense that the coefficients of interest are positive and
statistically significant, as expected. That is, an increase in the anti-inflation pref-
erence of the central bank induces a higher primary public deficit; and, likewise, an
increase in the anti-unemployment preference of the fiscal authority invites a higher
real interest rate. The size of the coefficient on the fiscal authority preference index
remains approximately the same whether we consider or not country fixed effects.
Conversely, the coefficient on the monetary authority preference index does increase
notably when country-specific effects are accounted for.
Could the effects that we attribute to central bank preferences be due in fact to
its independence per se? To address this alternative explanation we re-run the fixed-
effects estimator with robust standard errors adding to the regression the index for
central bank independence, or alternatively, substituting it for the index on central
bank preferences (see Table 2). We find that including the index of central bank
independence does not drive out the positive impact of inflation aversion on the
primary deficit. Moreover, central bank independence has no beating on the primary
public deficit. Interestingly, central bank independence has a negative effect on the
real interest rate, just the opposite of central bank's inflation aversion.
The last issue we examine is whether the potential endogeneity of the control
variables may be spuriously driving the results. Table 3 shows the instrumental-
variable estimation results, controlling in addition for unobserved country specific
effects. The coefficient on the central bank preference index is positive and significant
in the deficit regression, and so is the coefficient on the fiscal authority preference
index in the interest-rate regressions. The size of both coefficients rise by about fifty
percent once the endogeneity of the control variables is accounted for.
Finally, using the point estimates obtained in the last set of regressions, we can
assess the economic importance of these effects. The estimated coefficients with the
instrumental-variable estimation imply that a 1 standard deviation increase in mp is
associated with a primary deficit increase of 2 percent of GDP. As well, a 1 standard
1 3We had the option of modeling the unobserved effects as random, but using a Hausman-type
test we rejected the hypothesis that the effects were uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
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deviation increase in fp is associated with a rise of the domestic real interest rate by
0.8 percentage points (with respect to the international rate).
3.3 Conclusions
Central bank independence has contributed to achieve price stability and fiscal dis-
cipline for many countries. The conventional wisdom is that this is a necessary,
first-generation reform for not only monetary but also fiscal policy. The policy ques-
tion this paper raises is whether a second-generation reform consisting of institutional
incentives for domestic policy coordination could have potential benefits. The paper
presents a game-theoretic model where the fiscal and monetary authorities interact
to stabilize the economy in the face of negative supply shocks, having dissimilar pref-
erences with respect to output and inflation gaps and controlling different policy
instruments. It is assumed, realistically, that the monetary authority has a larger
utility loss from inflation than output gaps and conversely for the fiscal authority.
Modeled as either Nash or Stackelberg equilibria, the solution under lack of policy
coordination implies that, given a negative supply shock, the fiscal authority acts
more liberally and the monetary authority more conservatively. In particular, we
find that an increase in the preference divergence between the monetary and fiscal
authorities leads to, ceteris paribus, larger public deficits (the fiscal authority's policy
instrument) and real interest rates (the central bank's instrument).
The empirical section attempts to test an important implication of the model on
a pooled sample of 18 industrial countries with annual information for the period
1970-94. In particular, we test whether in countries and time periods where one
authority becomes more extreme in its preferences, the other takes a more radical
position regarding its policy instrument in order to pursue its objective. We proxy
for the fiscal authority's preference to avoiding unemployment and output gaps by
the political orientation of the party in executive power, with leftist governments
receiving a higher proxy value. We measure the monetary authority's preference
against inflation hikes by the formal central bank's commitment to price stability,
as expressed in its charter. Controlling for economic conditions and shocks, we find
that an increase in the anti-inflation preference of the central bank induces a higher
primary public deficit. Likewise, we find that an increase in the anti-unemployment
preference of the fiscal authority invites a higher difference of the domestic interest
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rate with respect to the international rate. These results hold true when we control
for economic conditions and shocks affecting the countries in our sample. Moreover,
they are statistically significant whether or not we allow for country-specific effects,
common time trends, robust standard errors, and the possibility of endogenous control
variables. We believe these results provide empirical support to the hypothesis that
under lack of coordination, the more divergent fiscal and monetary authorities are in
their preferences, the more radical positions they will take, potentially hurting the
economy along the way.
The main policy implication from the paper is that, notwithstanding the gains
from central bank independence, coordination both at the level of setting objectives
and at the level of policy implementation can alleviate the biases that move the
economy to sub-optimally higher fiscal deficits and interest rates. This goal can
be achieved with "second generation reforms" that should deal with the difficulties
of policy coordination, such as contract enforceability and the practical inability to
discern outcomes due to policies from those due to shocks.
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3.A Tables and Figures
Table 1: The Effects of Different Preferences Between Fiscal and
Monetary Authorities on Fiscal Deficits and Real Interest Rates:
Core Specification
Sample: 18 Industrial Countries, 1970 - 1994
Estimation: (a) Pool OLS (b) FE (c) Robust FE
Dependent Pool OLS (a) FE (b) Robust FE (c)
Variable D/GDP r_rint D/GDP r_rint D/GDP r_rint
Authorities' fp 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.010
(1.72) (3.86)** (1.95) (1.74) (2.98)**
preferences mp 0.011 0.009 0.039 0.039 0.019
(2.44)** (2.01 ) (3.88)** (2.52)** (1. 75)
Growth -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-2.97) (-5.86) (-5.77) (-5.96) (-3.94) (-6.06)
Inflation 0.125 -0.388 0.026 -0.433 0.026 -0.433
(2.84) (-9.05) (0.52) (-8.72) (0.35) (-7.74)
Private saving 0.263 0.378 0.378
(6.80) (5.98) (4.01)
National saving -0.010 0.106 0.106
(-0.32) (1.67) (1.55)
Trend -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(-1.97) (3.81 ) (-4.29) (3.29) (-3.52) (2.76)
R2 0.17 0.42 0.21 0.42 0.21 0.42
#Countries / Obs. 18/421 18/421 18/421 18/421 18/421 18/421
Notes: (a) (b) t-Statistics in parenthesis, (c) NW robust t-Statistics in parenthesis. Only for the
cross-preference variable (highlighted in gray): ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2: The Effects of Different Preferences Between Fiscal and
Monetary Authorities on Fiscal Deficits and Real Interest Rates:
Central banks' preference for inflation and independence
Sample: 18 Industrial Countries, 1970 - 1989
Estimation: Robust FE
Robust FE Robust FE
Dependent Variable D/GDP D/GDP D/GDP r_rint r_rint r_rint
Au thori ties' fp 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.013
(1.20) (1.22) (1.82) (2.30)** (2.47)** (3.31)**
preferences mp 0.058 0.063 0.064 0.091
(3.96)** (3.99)** (2.76) (3.78)
cbi -0.053 0.016 -0.276 -0.175
(-0.81 ) (0.20) (-4.06) (-2.39)
Growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-3.98) (-3.92) (-3.96) (-2.21) (-2.40) (-2.37)
Inflation 0.046 0.044 0.036 -0.341 -0.355 -0.365
(0.78) (0.75) (0.59) (-5.68) (-6.15) (-5.98)
Private saving 0.294 0.286 0.284
(3.01 ) (2.91) (2.81)
National saving -0.078 -0.075 -0.091
(-0.91) (-0.89) (-1.'05)
Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-2.85) (-2.94) (-2.45) (-0.63) (-0.76) (-0.35)
R2 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.22
#Countries / Obs. 18/336 18/336 18/336 18/336 18/336 18/336
Notes: NW robust t-Statistics in parenthesis. Only for the cross-preference variable (highlighted in
gray): ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 3: The Effects of Different Preferences Between Fiscal and
Monetary Authorities on Fiscal Deficits and Real Interest Rates:
IV Estimation
Sample: 18 Industrial Countries, 1970 - 1994
Estimation: (a) IV-FE (b) Robust IV-FE
IV FE (a) Robust IV FE (b)
Dependent Variable D/GDP r_rint D/GDP r_rint
Authorities' fp 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.017
(0.02) (2.83)** (0.01) (2.25)**
preferences mp 0.060 0.004 0.060 0.004
(2.52)** (0.19) (2.11)** (0.15)
Growth -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.014
(0.86) (-3.47) (0.78) (-3.09)
Inflation 0.623 -1.035 0.623 -1.035
(1.34) (-2.47) (1.15) (-1.99)
Private saving 0.188 0.188
(0.49) (0.48)
National saving 0.251 0.251
(1.33) (1.12)
Trend 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.40) (0.82) (0.37) (0.64)
R2 0.17 0.35 0.17 0.35
#Countries / Obs. 18/421 18/421 18/421 18/421
Notes: (a) t-Statistics in parenthesis, (b) NW robust t-Statistics in parenthesis.
Only for the cross-preference variable (highlighted in gray): ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%. Exogenous variables: fp and mp; Exogenous instruments:
Foreign growth rate weighted by trade share, terms of trade, logarithm of GDP
pic, logarithm of GDP pic squared, urban population (% of total population),
active population 15-65 (% of total population), senior population 65+ (% of total
population) .
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